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INTRODUCTION
The American system of civil dispute resolution is in crisis. Al-
though the number of lawsuits may or may not be a problem, the
length and cost of resolving lawsuits undoubtedly is. Judges, lawyers
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and clients agree that discovery is the root of the problem. Discovery
is riddled with abuse, delay and expense. The problems of discovery
have given rise to a torrent of reform proposals culminating in the
recently amended Federal Rules of Civil Procedure ("FRCP").
In order to directly confront the most serious concerns about
discovery, the new rules contain some of the most radical changes in
discovery of the past fifty years. The new rules have not, however, been
universally embraced. The new mandatory disclosure provisions of
Rule 26(a) are at the center of the controversy. Few amendments to
the FRCPS have been as hotly debated or as vehemently attacked.
Although the new rules went into effect on December 1, 1993, the
storm over automatic disclosures rages unabated.
When I first read the new rules' requirement that a party auto-
matically disclose information previously required only upon a formal
discovery request, I had some trepidation about such a radical depar-
ture from established practice. Voluntary disclosure of information
that might expose the faultlines in a client's case seemed at first like
high treason. Voluntary disclosures also seemed antithetical to the
adversary process because, by providing a level field in discovery bat-
tles, they diminish the advantage that a cunning lawyer might have over
a less gifted opponent.
As I dissected the new provisions in preparation for my pre-trial
procedure class, I began to confront my discomfort with the concept
of automatic disclosure in the adversary process: I am a lawyer trained
in the winning-is-everything model of adversary practice. I am also
conservative by nature and, even if unhappy with the status quo, I
distrust change. More to the point, I was a civil litigator. A gladiator.
Considering how infrequently I actually went to war ... er . . . I mean,
trial, I admit enjoying the thrill of victory-at-any-cost that discovery
battles afforded me.
With this bit of self-knowledge in mind, I have read the many
articles and letters by lawyers and commentators criticizing the new
disclosure provisions. Although I identify with most of the expressed
concerns, I realize that our initial hostility to automatic disclosure is
the result of a widely held, but mistaken, perception that the adversary
process means war. Upon reevaluating the role of the lawyer in the
adversary process, I recognize the benefits of the new automatic dis-
closure requirements. Furthermore, when disparate groups including
the Clinton Justice Department, big-firm lawyers, big business, manu-
facturers, insurers, Justices Scalia and Thomas, public interest groups,
professors, many judges, most organized bars, and both plaintiff and
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defense lawyers all rallied against the new disclosure requirement, it
seemed the rule deserved closer scrutiny.
As I reread the disclosure provision after studying the articulation
of its goals by the judges and lawyers who proposed the new amend-
ment, I began to understand its prudence. Discovery without automat-
ic disclosures contains an inescapable quandary: lawyers instinctively
believe that their own discovery requests are proper and their oppo-
nents' requests are abusive. In other words, the same lawyers who
design their own discovery requests as broadly as possible will construe
their opponents' discovery as narrowly as possible. This leads to inevi-
table disputes. Automatic disclosures circumvent this conflict by requir-
ing full disclosures from all parties.
My conclusion is that most objections to automatic disclosures are,
like my initial visceral reactions, unfounded. Not only are automatic
disclosures consistent with the ideal of the adversary process, but they
also provide a unique opportunity to achieve the essential premise of
the adversary model: fair resolution of a dispute. Additionally, a cur-
sory survey of actual practice under the new rules reveals that the
predictions of disclosure disasters have not materialized.
This Article examines the new rules, discusses some of the antici-
pated problems, and proposes a plan to use the new rules to prepare
discovery that achieves earlier and more efficient exchange of infor-
mation. Part I contains a brief overview of discovery practice under the
old rules. Part II analyzes the most significant changes to the rules,
particularly those affecting discovery. Part III contrasts the dire predic-
tions before the rules went into effect with the experiences of some
lawyers and judges after several months of practice under the new
rules. Part IV contends that automatic disclosures will result in shorter,
less costly discovery, and fairer dispute resolution. It also predicts that
automatic disclosures will have a salutary effect on the often misunder-
stood adversarial process. Part IV also urges federal and state courts to
adopt the new automatic disclosure provisions. Finally, Part V provides
an innovative strategy for using the new rules to achieve faster, less
costly discovery, consistent both with the adversarial process and attor-
neys' ethical obligations.
I. DISCOVERY PRACTICE BEFORE THE NEW RULES
Discovery is crucial to dispute resolution in an adversary system.
Discovery is the principal fact-gathering mechanism in the formal civil
litigation process. Discovery is where most pre-trial disputes are played
out and where many cases are effectively won or lost.
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The principle behind discovery is simple: mutual knowledge of all
the relevant facts of a dispute leads to its fair resolution) If the parties,
the court and the trier of fact have access to all the relevant facts of a
dispute, its outcome at trial will more likely be fair. Moreover, early
access to all potential evidence often leads to early settlement. Early
settlement avoids costly trials. The primary means to achieve full access
to the facts is discovery. 2
A. Historical Development of the Discovery Process: From No Discovery
to Discovery Wars to Automatic Disclosure
The modern rules of discovery evolved to release the adjudicatory
process from the English common law system of writs and formalistic
pleadings in which hyper-technical formulas rather than merit or fair-
ness decided cases) Under the common law system, pre-trial disputes
focused on the wording of the pleadings rather than on the facts of
the case.4 Because the facts of a case were only of secondary interest,
common law procedure contained no discovery scheme. Although
common law courts eventually allowed some crude forms of discovery
like the "bill of particulars," our modern discovery practice evolved
primarily from equity proceedings. 5
In federal courts, the break with common law pleadings and the
introduction of the discovery process occurred in 1938 with the adop-
tion of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure." The authors of the FRCP
designed discovery to make information gathering a self-executing
' See Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495,507 (1947).
2 The discovery provisions of the FRCP were designed to achieve "mutual knowledge of all
the relevant facts." Hickman, 329 U.S. at 500-01.
5 Commen tators have described "the dance of the common law pleadings" where one misstep
in the rigid requirements resulted in the death of the action. Sre, e.g., Modern Procedure in
Historical Perspective, in STEPHEN C. YEAZELI. E' Al.., CIVIL PROCEDURE 345-60 (3d ed. 1992); see
also SIR FREDERICK POLLOCK & FREDERIC MAITLAND, THE HISTORY or ENGLISH LAW BEFORE THE
TIME or EDWARD I (2d. ed. 1968).
4 STEPHAN LANDSMAN, THE ADVERSARY SYSTEM: A DESCRIPTION AND DEFENSE 17 (1984).
5 See, e.g., IF,DsoN R. SUNDERLAND, CASES AND MATERIALS ON TRIAL AND APPELLATE PRACTICE
1-4 (1941).
See 4 CHARLES A. Wtticirr & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
§ 1004, at 28 (1987). Wright & Miller describe how the original FRCP became law in 1938 when
Congress adjourned without taking action on the Supreme Court's adoption of the rules. Inter-
estingly, the same congressional inaction allowed the new disclosure rules to become effective.
See infra notes 111-20 and accompanying text.
Not surprisingly, the objections to the original FRCP were almost as intense as the objections
in the new disclosure provisions. See, e.g., John J. Parker, Handling A Case Under the New Federal
Rules, '14 A.B.A. J. 793 (1938) (judge Parker concludes that the opposition to the original FRCP
was primarily due to "the inherent conservatism of the professional mind," and he notes that
lawyers have traditionally objected to any change, no matter how reasonable).
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process. In other words, under the rules, parties were expected to use
discovery to prepare their case without having to resort to judicial
proceedings.
Specifically, Federal Rules 26 to 37 were meant to accomplish
early, open and complete discovery without court intervention. How-
ever, the initial versions of the rules failed to achieve these goals.
Filtered through a skewed perception of the adversarial process, law-
yers often fail or refuse to use the rules to achieve the goals of discov-
ery. Lawyers generally use the rules of discovery to obtain early and
open discovery from their opponents while simultaneously doing every-
thing possible to prevent open discovery of their own clients' informa-
tion. In other words, lawyers have used discovery as a proxy for battle.
B. The Evolution of the Lawsuit: How Discovery Altered the Role of
Lawyers From "Trial Lawyers" to "Litigators"
An understanding of how the new rules might make litigation less
costly, lawyers less abusive, and dispute resolution more fair, requires
an understanding of how modern discovery has affected the institution
of dispute resolution in an adversary system.
Modern discovery in federal and state courts changed the institu-
tion of the lawsuit from "trial" to "litigation" and the role of the lawyer
from "trial attorney" to "litigator." A lawsuit used to mean a "trial." Trial
involved the equivalent of thrilling hand-to-hand combat "with surprise
and technicalities as . . . [the' chief weapons."' In the old days, the
essence of a trial lawyer was personified by Perry Mason. In the last
few minutes of trial, Perry Mason would invariably introduce the sur-
prise witness or evidence that saved his client and left prosecutor Ber-
ger with a perplexed frown on his face. Discovery, however, changed
all that.
Modern discovery dramatically reduced the element of surprise
in a lawsuit. As a result, discovery transformed the lawsuit from an
exciting "mano-a-mano" battle to a sluggish boxing match between
overweight contenders. At its best, a modern lawsuit resembles a tedi-
ous super-heavy weight boxing match where two lumbering fighters
sluggishly loiter in the ring doing much posturing and little punching.
The result: time consuming and inefficient dispute resolution. At its
worst, a lawsuit resembles an uneven match between a 300-pound
7 Paul R. Sugarman & Marc G. Perlin, Proposed Changes to Discovery Rules in Aid of "Tort
Reform": Has the Case Been Made?, 42 Am. U. L. REv. 1465, 1490 (1993) (quoting ARTHUR T.
CASES AND OTHER MATERIALS ON MODERN PROCEDURE AND JUDICIAL. ADMINISTRA-
TION 10 (1952)).
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heavy-weight fighter and a 100-pound feather-weight boxer. The result:
time consuming, inefficient and unfair dispute resolution.
C. A Unanimous Demand for Discovery Reform
In recent years, lawyers, judges and commentators have loudly
complained that discovery does not work as intended, is fraught with
abuse and undue delay, and is too expensive. 8 Defense lawyers com-
plain that plaintiffs' lawyers use discovery to "fish" for causes of action.
Plaintiffs' lawyers' protest that defense lawyers use discovery as a weapon
to exhaust weaker opponents. A few commentators have denounced
pre-trial discovery as an unfair enterprise, given the disparities in
resources and wealth between many parties." Judges deplore obstrep-
erous lawyers who force the court to spend precious time intervening
in unnecessary discovery disputes. Lawyers and judges complain that
cases too often are settled not due to the claims' merit, but rather to
avoid lengthy and costly discovery.'" In short, the consensus is that
discovery before the new rules was the curse of the civil justice system.
The problems with discovery, however, have as much to do with
how lawyers use the discovery rules as with the rules themselves." In
transforming the lawsuit from trial to litigation, modern discovery also
changed the role of the lawyer in the lawsuit. Because only a relatively
8 See, e.g., Wayne C. Brazil, Views from the Front Lines: Observations by Chicago Lawyers About
the System of Civil Discovery, 1980 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 219. In 1989, for example, lawyers and
judges responded to a Harris poll on the status of federal civil litigation by overwhelmingly
pointing to discovery abuse as the single most important cause of costs and delays. Louis HARRIS
& Assoc., INC., PROCEDURAL REFORM OF THE CIVIL JUSTICE SYSTEM (Mar. 1989); see also Thomas
D. Rowe, jr., ALL Study on Paths to a "Better Way": Litigation, Alternatives, and Accommodation:
Background Paper, 1989 DUKE L.J. 824. One of the most vocal critics in the last decade was then
Vice-President Dan Quayle who, with a straight face and the power of the "President's Council
on Competitiveness," claimed that American companies could not compete in the international
market because of the "time-consuming, burdensome, and expensive pre-trial discovery process."
Dan Quayle, Civil justice Reform, 41 AM. U. L. REV. 559, 563-64 (1992).
" See Marc Galanter, Why the Raves Come Out Ahead: Speculation on the Limits of Legal Change,
9 LAW & SOC'Y REV. 95 (1974); Deborah L. Rhode, Ethical Perspectives on Lawyering, 37 STAN. L.
Rev. 589, 597 (1985).
I" See, e.g., William H. Erickson, The Pound Conference Recommendations: A Blueprint for the
Justice. System in the Twenty-First Century, 76 F.R.D. 277, 288 (1978).
My views, generalitations and recommendations are based not only on research and
conversations with judges and practitioners but also on my experience as a clerk for a federal
district judge and as a litigation associate in two large law firms in Chicago, Illinois. During my
first two years of practice, I represented physicians, hospitals, manufacturers and insurers in
medical malpractice and products liability cases. During the following four years I represented
plaintiffs and defendants in commercial cases ranging from breach of contract to patent infringe-
ment claims. The value of the claims in these cases ranged from $5,000 to $35,000,000.
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small number of civil cases actually go to trial,'' modern discovery
changed "trial lawyers" into "litigators." Frustrated because discovery
recast their role from swashbuckling trial lawyers to administrators of
the pre-trial litigation process, many lawyers abuse discovery in order
to recapture the lost excitement of trial.
The result is discovery disputes based more on posturing than
substance. With few opportunities to go to trial, many lawyers use
discovery disputes to demonstrate to their opponents that they are
worthy "adversaries" and to their clients that they are worth their
substantial fees. Judges in turn are forced to spend an inordinate
amount of court time resolving petty discovery disputes despite the fact
that discovery was intended to be self-executing.
D. The Reform Frenzy
Persistent condemnation of modern discovery practice resulted in
a torrent of proposals to reform the system. The proposals culminated
in the recently amended FRCP, which contain radical changes in pre-
trial discovery practice.
Such was the outcry for change in civil litigation practice that
every branch of government weighed in with recommendations for
discovery reform. In 1990, Congress enacted the Civil Justice Reform
Act ("CJRA"). The CJRA authorized the creation of pilot programs in
the federal district . courts to experiment with, among other things,
improvements to "facilitate deliberate adjudication of civil cases on the
merits [and] monitor discovery."Ts
On October 23, 1991, President George Bush issued Executive
Order 12,778, to "facilitate the just and efficient resolution of civil
claims" involving the United States Government.' 4 Vice-President Dan
Quayle's Council on Competitiveness also issued a report in 1991,
recommending.specific changes to the discovery process.°
In August 1991, the Advisory Committee on Rules of Practice and
Procedure of the Judicial Conference of the United States circulated
I2 About 5% of civil cases, less in purely commercial disputes, actually go to trial. See REPORT
OF THE DIRECTOR OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATEN COURTS, 1989 REPORT
OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES 21.
13 28 U.S.C. §§ 471-82 (Supp. 1993). The CJRA, also known as the "Widen Bill," was signed
into law by President Bush on December 1, 1990. Id.
' a See Exec. Order No. 12,778, pmbl., 3 C.F.R. 359, 360 (1991).
15 See PRESIDENT'S COUNCIL ON COMPETITIVENESS, AGENDA FOR CIVIL JUSTICE REFORM IN
AMERICA (Aug. 1991). Although the Council's agenda had less to do with reforming the system
and more with restricting the recovery of injured persons, it was advanced under the euphemisms
of "tort reform" and "civil justice reform."
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for public comment its proposed amendments to the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure.' 6 In April 1992, the Advisory Committee approved the
recent amendments, and in November 1992, the Judicial Conference
transmitted them to the United States Supreme Court. On April 22,
1993, Chief Justice Rehnquist submitted the amendments to Congress
accompanied by a tepid endorsementi 7 Justice Scalia added a blister-
ing dissent to which Justices Thomas and Souter joined.' 8 Opposition
to the disclosure provisions came from every quarter, ranging from
President Clinton's Justice Department to plaintiffs' and defense law-
yers.' 9 Despite almost unanimous opposition to the amended rules'
disclosure provisions, Congress failed to adopt any changes and the
rules automatically became law on December 1, 1993.20
10 See Committee on Rules of Practice & Procedure or the Judicial Conference of the United
States, Proposed Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the Federal Rules of Evidence,
137 F.R.D. 53 (1991).
The Advisory Committee, comprised of members of the bench and bar appointed by the
judicial Conference, formulates rules that eventually are transmitted by the judicial Conference
to the Supreme Court. See 28 U.S.C. § 2073 (1988). Section 2078 authorizes the Judicial Confer-
ence to appoint committees to draft rules of practice and procedure for federal courts. These
rules arc then transmitted to the United Slates Supreme Court, which is authorized by § 2072 to
propose these rules. The Supreme Court reviews the rules and transmits them to Congress to
become effective at a specified time unless Congress affirmatively acts to change them.
17 H.R. Doc. No. 74, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. 112-15 (1993), reprinted in 146 ER.D. 401-728
(1993). Chief Justice Rehnquist forwarded the proposed rules with a letter to Speaker of the
House of Representatives Thomas S. Foley where he noted that "this transmittal does not
necessarily indicate that the Court itself would have proposed these amendments in the form
submitted." Id. ChielJusfice Rehnquist's letter w Speaker Thomas Foley is reprinted in 146 ER.D.
403 (1993).
18 61 U.S.L.W. 4392-94 (Apr. 27, 1993), reprinted in 146 F.R.D. 507-13 (1993). justice Scalia's
objections included predictions that the new rules would increase ancillary litigation regarding
what is disclosable and would lead to disclosure of irrelevant information. Scalia also protested
that the automatic disclosures are inconsistent with the adversary system. See infra notes 110-14
and accompanying text.
Ill See, e.g., Griffin B. Bell et al., Automatic Disclosure and Discovery —The Rush To Reform, 27
GA. L. REv. 1 (1993). Bell's article enumerates scores of widely diverse groups who opposed the
disclosure provisions. He names, among others, the American Bar Association, state and local
bars, corporations such as Amoco, General Motors and Ford, the American Corporate Counsel
Association, American Trial Lawyers Association, the Defense Research Institute, the Alliance of
American Insurers, Ralph Nader's Public Citizen Litigation Group, the American Civil Liberties
Union, the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People, Legal Defense Fund,
the Product Liability Advisory Counsel, and even the American Institute of Certified Public
Accountants. Id.
Ex-Attorney General Griffin Bell and Chilton D. Vanier are partners at Atlanta's King &
Spalding and have represented General Motors, among others, in product liability cases. Financial
support for Bell's article came from the Product Liability Advisory Council Foundation, an entity
that represents the interests of mantifiicturers and other businesses in product liability litigation.
See also 61 U.S.L.W. 4372 (Apr. 21, 1993).
2n Several members of Congress introduced H.R. 2814 for the specific purpose of killing the
disclosure provisions of the new rules, Bill to Delete Discovery Rules Rlorted to House Committee,
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II. THE NEW RULES OF DISCOVERY: THE AMENDED RULES OF CIVIL
PROCEDURE
The amended FRCP, which apply primarily to cases filed after
December 1, 1993, include significant changes to Rules 4, 11, 26 and
30. 2 ' The most dramatic changes to the rules were in the area of
discovery.
A. Overview of the New Discovery Provisions
The most significant feature of the new discovery provisions is
found in the combination of Rules 26(a) and (1) with Rule 16. To-
gether, these rules delineate a mechanism by which the parties ex-
change relevant information about the case early in the litigation and
without formal discovery. 22
 First, the parties' lawyers look to the plead-
ings to determine the scope of required disclosures. Then, the lawyers
meet informally to refine disputed issues about the case and the extent
of required disclosures. Finally, the parties must submit any contested
BNA Mgt. Briefing, Aug. 6, 1993. Although everyone assumed the bill would pass, it was held up
in the Senate, and Congress adjourned without amending the new rules. Randall Samborn, New
Discovery Rules Take Effect; Bill to Stop Change Dies, NAT'L Lj., Dec. 6, 1993, at 3; Civil Discovery
Bill Bogs Down; Revised Rules Take Effect Dec. I, Daily Rep. for Executives (UNA), Nov. 24, 1993,
at A-7 to A-8.
Interestingly, the CJRA, President Bush's executive order, Vice-President Quayle's report, and
the Advisory Committee's proposed amendments to the FRCP all included some form of auto-
matic disclosure of certain types of information. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 473(a) (4) (Stipp. 1993);
FED. R. Civ. P. 26(a) ( I); 3 C.F.R. 359, 361 (1991); PRESIDENT'S COUNCIL ON COMPETITIVENESS,
ACE:NDA FOR CIVIL JUSTICE REFORM IN AMERICA, supra note 15, at 16.
21 The new Rule 4 encourages defendants to waive service by extending the time to answer
from 20 to 60 days and by making defendants pay the cost of service if they refuse to waive it.
The new Rule I1 should reduce what has been called the "collateral industry of Rule 11
motion practice" by, among other things, providing for discretionary, instead of inundatory,
sanctions for improper pleadings. The Advisory Committee also seeks to take the profit out of
Rule 11 by limiting "fee-shifting" and emphasizing non-monetary sanctions. The new rule further
provides for a 21 day "safe-harbor" to allow a challenged pleading to be withdrawn before a
motion for sanctions is filed. Finally, the new Rule 11 no longer applies to discovery papers but
does apply to a party's continuing duty to withdraw a pleading found to be unsupported by
subsequently discovered facts.
22
 Rule 26(a)(1) requires automatic disclosure of information previously produced only
pursuant to formal discovery requests. These disclosures must he made at or within ten clays after
the mandatory 26(1) meeting that must be held no later than 14 days before the Rule 16(h) order
is entered. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(a) (1) & 26(f).
During the Rule 26(f) meeting the parties' attorneys must clarify issues related to the
automatic disclosures and must prepare a disclosure and discovery plan to be submitted to the
court before the Rule 16(b) order is entered. See FED. R. Civ. P. 26(0. Final adjustments to the
Rule 26(a)( 1) disclosures may be made by the judge during the Rule 16(b) conference. FED. R.
Civ. P. 16(13)(4).
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disclosure issues to the court for final determination of the scope of
disclosures.
B. Rule 26(a) Disclosures
Rule 26 has been thoroughly revised to encompass formal discov-
ery as well as the new automatic disclosure requirements. Reflecting
the rule's new substance, Rule 26(a) has been retitled "Required Dis-
closures; Methods to Discover Additional Matter." 23 Rule 26(a) imposes
a duty on parties to disclose certain categories of information, includ-
ing routinely discoverable information, expert testimony, and pretrial
witnesses and exhibits, without waiting for formal discovery requests.
Rule 26(a) establishes three distinct types of pre-formal discovery dis-
closures: (1) Persons, Documents/Things, Damages and Insurance;
(2) Expert Opinions; and (3) Miscellaneous Trial Disclosures.
Rule 26(a) (1) (A) requires a party to make informal preliminary
disclosures of the types of information which were previously sought
by routine formal interrogatories, such as the identity of all witnesses
and persons with discoverable information." The disclosure also must
generally identify the information in the possession of each person."
25 FED. R. Ctv. P. 26(a).
24 FED. R. Cm P. 26(a) provides:
(1) Initial Disclosures. Except to the extent otherwise stipulated or directed by
order or local rule, a party shall, without awaiting a discovery request, provide to
other parties:
(A) the name and, if known, the address and telephone number of each individ-
ual likely to have discoverable information relevant to disputed facts alleged with
particularity in the pleadings, identifying the subjects of the information;
(B) a copy of or a description by category and location of, all documents, data
compilations, and tangible things in the possession, custody, or control of the party
that are relevant to disputed facts alleged with particularity in the pleadings;
(C) a computation of any category of damages claimed by the disclosing party,
making available for inspection and copying as under Rttle 34 the documents or
other evidentiary material, not privileged or protected from disclosure, on which
such computation is based, including materials bearing on the nature and extent
of injuries suffered; and
(D) for inspection and copying as under Rule 34 any insurance agreement under
which any person carrying on an insurance business may be liable to satisfy part or
all of a judgment which may be entered in the action or to indemnify or reimburse
for payments made to satisfy the judgment.
Unless otherwise stipulated or directed by the court, these disclosures shall be
made at or within 10 days after the meeting of the parties tinder subdivision (Q. A
party shall make its initial disclosures based on the information then reasonably
available to it and is not excused from making its disclosures because it has not fully
completed its investigation of the case or because it challenges the sufficiency of
another party's disclosures or because another party has not made its disclosures.
25 FED. R. Ctv. P. 26(a) (1)(A) advisory committee's note ("Indicating briefly the general
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The controversy about 26(a) (1) disclosures arises out of the require-
ment that in addition to supportive information, the parties must
automatically also disclose damaging information. 26
Subsection (a) (1) (B) requires that parties disclose copies or de-
scriptions of relevant documents in their custody or control," with the
idea that parties may not simply bury their opponents in a blizzard of
unorganized and often irrelevant documents. If parties choose to dis-
close copies of relevant documents, they must categorize or index them
in a manner that reflects the issues to which the documents are rele-
vant. 28 If the parties choose instead to disclose a description of the
relevant documents, the disclosure must likewise categorize the docu-
ments.29 Whether disclosing documents or descriptions of documents,
the categorization must be clear so that the other parties can decide
which original documents they need to examine. As with information
regarding witnesses, all relevant documents are to be disclosed whether
or not they support the disclosing party's case. 3°
Subsection (a) (1) (C) requires a party to disclose the computation
of all claimed damages and to make available for inspection or copying
all supporting discoverable documentation. 3 ' Of course, a disclosing
party does not have to disclose a calculation of damages if this can only
be accomplished with information in the possession of other parties. 52
Finally, Subsection (a) (1) (D) requires that a party automatically pro-
vide copies of insurance policies or allow the other parties to inspect
the policies.33
topics on which such persons have information should not be burdensome, and will assist other
parties in deciding which depositions will actually be needed.").
26 The disclosing party must automatically disclose all witnesses "whether or not their testimony
will be supportive of the position of the disclosing party." FED. R. CR% P. 26(a) (1)(A) advisory
committee's note (emphasis added). For more on the controversy see infra notes 110-14 and
accompanying text.
27
 See n:D. R. Cm P. 26(a) (1) (B).
'28 Disclosures under 26(a) (1) (B)
should describe and categorise, to the extent identified during their initial investi-
gation, the nature and location of potentially relevant documents and records . .
sufficiently to enable opposing parties (I) to make an informed decision concern-
ing which documents might need to be examined, at least initially, and (2) to frame
their document request in a manner likely to avoid squabbles resulting from the
wording of the requests.
FED. R. Qv. P. 26(a}(1)(B) advisory committee's note.
29 Id.
30 Id.
31 FEL). R. Civ. P. 26(a) ( 1)(C).
32 See not R. Chi. P. 26(a) (I )(c) advisory committee's note.
" See FED. R. Qv. P. 26(a) (1)(D).
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Rule 26(a) (2) requires extensive disclosure of the identity of ex-
pert witnesses without waiting for a formal discovery request. 34 The
disclosure must include a detailed report, not merely a summary,
prepared and signed by the expert. The report must cover the opinions
and basis for the opinions, as well as the experience, writings and
qualifications of the expert. 35 Additionally, the report must include the
compensation that the expert has received or will receive as well as a
list of cases in which the expert has testified over the previous four
years.36 Parties must disclose expert reports whether the expert is re-
tained or specially employed to provide testimony or is an employee
of the party whose duties regularly involve giving expert testimony."
Although the rules still permit the deposition of an expert wit-
ness," the Advisory Committee anticipates that the detailed report will
eliminate or shorten the expert's deposition." Rule 26(a) (2) sets out
times for disclosure of expert witnesses. The rule suggests that the
court normally should include these times in the Rule 16(b) schedul-
ing order and that ordinarily a party with the burden of proof should
disclose its experts first. 4°
Subsection (a) (3) requires disclosure, shortly before trial, of in-
formation regarding witnesses and evidence that may be used at trial
"other than solely for impeachment." 41 This information is similar to
that which is usually exchanged via pretrial order. 42 As with all disclo-
sures, the Rule 16(b) scheduling order should control the time for
disclosure of trial materials. 43 The rule also provides, however, that the
trial disclosures may be made by a special pretrial order or, at the latest,
at least thirty days before trial."
Rule 26(a) (1) specifies that the information disclosable under
(a) (1) must be turned over automatically at or within ten days of the




38 FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b) (4)(A).
39 See FED. R. Civ. P. 26(a) (2) advisory committee's note. Parties seeking to depose their
opponents' experts may have to pay for the expert's time at the rate the experts charge the parties
who hire them.
40 For example, Rule 26(a) (2) (C) provides that disclosure of expert witness information
should be made no later than 90 days before trial or at times set by the court. See. FED. R. Civ. P.
26(a) (2) (C) & advisory committee's notes.
41 FED. R. ay. P. 26(a) (3).
42 See FED. R. CR,. P. 26(a) (3) advisory committee's note.
43 Id. For details on the Rule 16(b) scheduling order, see infra notes 80-86 and accompanying
text.
44 FED. R. Qv. P. 26(a) (3).
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26(f) informal meeting between the parties or, if necessary, at times
directed by the court." The 26(f) meeting must be held at least four-
teen days before the Rule 16(b) scheduling order is entered." Since
the Rule 16(b) order is to be entered no later than ninety days after a
defendant appears or 120 days after service, the timing of disclosures
can be calculated by backtracking from the date the Rule 16(b) order
is to be entered. If disclosures are not completed before the Rule 16(b)
conference, a schedule for their completion must be included in the
16(b) scheduling order.47
Lawyers should understand that the timing stated in the rules is
simply a ceiling which provides time limitations, not absolutes. The
rules contemplate a disclosure "process" that includes informal discus-
sions between the attorneys before disclosures are due. Informal con-
tacts soon after the complaint is received will result in more effective
investigation as well as more focused and perhaps earlier disclosures."
The express requirement that a party need only disclose informa-
tion "relevant to disputed facts alleged with particularity in the plead-
ings" limits initial disclosures to allegations that are specific and clear
and that the disclosing party does not admit." This should alert the
parties that broad allegations proper under notice pleading may result
in less rather than more disclosures. 50 Otherwise the disclosing party
45
 FED. R. Qv. P. 26(a) (1), Many district courts have modified the times for disclosures. For
example in the United States District Court for the Western District of Missouri, 26(a) (1)
disclosures should be made at the 26(1) meeting which, itself, must be held no later than 30 days
before the Rule 16 conference. See Local Court Rules of the United States District Court for the
Western District of Missouri, effective July 1, 1994, at 15.2-15.3. The fact that the FRCP as well
as the local rules also call for a discovery/scheduling order to be submitted to the court within
10 days of the 26(1) meeting reflect a flexible approach to the timing of disclosures.
46
 FED. R. CR'. P. 26(0. Local rule 15 of the Western District of Missouri requires that the
26(f) meeting take place no later than 30 days before the Rule 16(b) [known as RISDI scheduling
order, which itself is to be entered no later than 90 clays after the appearance of a defendant or
120 days after the complaint is served on any defendant, whichever is earlier. More details on the
26(f) meeting can be found infra at notes 67-68 and accompanying text.
47
 For details on the Rule 16(b) scheduling order, see infra notes 80-86 and accompanying
text.
48 See, e.g., FED. R. Civ. P. 26(a) (I) advisory committee's note.
49 FED. R. Cry. P. 26(a) (1) & advisory committee's notes.
5° Some lawyers and commentators have argued that the new rules have done away with
notice pleading. Colleen McMahon, Critics Turn Up Heat on Proposed Discovery Rules, N.Y. Li.,
July 19, 1993, at Sl; Jaret Seiberg, All or Nothing, CONN. L. nun., May 2, 1994, at 12 (citing United
States District Judge Warren Eginton); see also Bell et al., supra note 19, at 30; Gerald G.
MacDonald, Hesiod, Agesilaus and Ride 26: A Proposal for a More Effective Mandatory Initial
Disclosure Procedure, 28 WARE FORES'I' L. REv. 819, 838 (1993). This is not so. To the extent that
there was "notice pleading" before the new rules, the disclosure provisions do not change
pleading requirements. The disclosure provision merely provides some incentive to plead with
more specificity to secure better disclosures. Plaintiffs can still make vague and general allega-
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would be obligated to a scope of disclosure out of proportion to any
real need. Specific and clear complaints, defenses, counterclaims or
cross-claims will result in more complete disclosures of witnesses, docu-
ments and expert witnesses.
Before making Rule 26(a) (1) disclosures, a party must make a
"reasonable inquiry" into the facts of the case.51 Whether an inquiry
has been "reasonable" before disclosure depends on the circumstances
of each case, but several factors will affect the exhaustiveness of an
inquiry. These factors include (1) the complexity and number of the
issues alleged with particularity in the pleadings; (2) the location,
number and availability of the witnesses and documents; (3) how long
the party has to conduct the inquiry; and (4) the extent of the working
relationship between the disclosing party and the party's lawyer, par-
ticularly in handling similar litigation. 52
The rules contemplate that a party will make its initial disclosures
based on the specificity of the pleadings and the information reason-
ably available to the party within the time allowed for disclosure." The
rules, however, are clear that a party cannot postpone making disclo-
sures either because it has not completed its investigation, or because
the other party has not completed its disclosures. 54
A party must make its Rule 26(a) disclosures in writing, must serve
them on the other parties, and must file them with the court..." The
disclosures must be signed by the party's lawyer or, if unrepresented,
by the party.56 The signature certifies that the disclosure is complete
and correct as of the time made. 57 This certification is similar to that
required by Rule 11 and it likewise subjects the signatory to sanctions
if the disclosures are improper or incomplete:"
Rule 26(b) (5) is new and requires a party claiming privilege or
work product protection to make the claim expressly and describe the
nature of the information not disclosed. This allows the other side to
dons. This may affect the extent of disclosures the defendants must make but it does not invalidate
the complaint.
0 FED. K. Cly. P. 26(g) (1).
52 FED. R. Cm P. 26(a) (1) advisory committee's note.
55 FED, K. Cm P. 26(a) (I) advisory committee's note. This includes information the disclos-
ing party obtains during the 26(i) meeting. For details on the disclosure mechanism, see infra
notes 55-63 and accompanying text.
54 FED. K. Cm P. 26(a)
55 FED. K. CD/. P. 26(a)
56 FED. K. Civ. P. 26(a)






58 For details on sanctions for improper or incomplete disclosures, see Wm notes 64-66 and
accompanying text.
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evaluate the claimed protection. 59 This requirement should accomplish
two goals: first, it should prevent lawyers from unilaterally withholding
information without mentioning its existence; second, it should dis-
courage arbitrary and tenuous claims of privilege or work product.
Rule 26(e) (1) imposes on parties a new duty to supplement dis-
closures at timely intervals as the investigation continues, and irrespec-
tive of whether the other side has disclosed."' This includes a new duty
to supplement expert opinion should it change subsequent to the
initial disclosure under Rule 26(a) (2).
The disclosure obligations of 26(a) (1) can be modified or sus-
pended by stipulation of the parties, court order or local rule.° This
provision, known as the "opt-out" rule, is meant to accommodate the
Civil Justice Reform Act that directed districts to experiment with
different procedures to "reduce the time and expense of civil litiga-
tion."62 Under this provision, parties may stipulate to waive or modify
disclosures and judges may modify or suspend the disclosure require-
ment on a case-by-case basis."
Rules 26(b) and 37 provide for enforcement of 26(a) disclosures.
Rule 26(g) (3), in conjunction with Rule 37, allows the court to order
a range of sanctions including fee shifting. Rule 37 sanctions may
include, but are not limited to, attorney's fees. Rule 37(c) (1) contains
a self-executing sanction for failure to disclose information "without
substantial justification."64 This sanction results in exclusion at trial of
the non-disclosed evidence." Rule 37 also allows courts discretion to
order, in addition to attorney's fees, "a wide range of other sanctions—
such as declaring specified facts to be established, preventing contra-
dictory evidence, or, like spoliation of evidence, allowing the jury to
59 FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(5) & advisory committee's note. The rule also applies to claims of
work product and privilege in response to formal discovery requests. Id.
69 FED. R. CIV. R 26(e) (1).
61 FED. R. Civ. R 26(a) (1) advisory committee notes.
62 FED. R. CR% P. 26(a)(1) advisory committee's note. Pursuant to the CJRA, several jurisdic-
tions have required some form of disclosure for almost two years.
°This provision has also allowed many district courts to opt out of the disclosure provisions
altogether. To date, 35 of the 94 federal districts have adopted the new FRCP. News & Trends,
TRIAL, July 1994, at 95. While only a dozen districts have rejected the new rules outright, many
courts have opted out of them because they already have local rules designed to expedite
discovery. Moreover, several districts enacted local rules to expedite discovery pursuant to the
CJRA. Id.; New Discovery Rules Are Here to Stay—But Many Districts Balk, LAW. WKLY. USA, Mar.
14, 1994, at 22.
14 FED. R. Qv.	 37(c)(1).
65 Id. For example, under 37(c)(1), any expert testimony not disclosed under (a) (S) may not
be allowed as direct testimony at trial.
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be informed of the fact of nondisclosure—that . . . can be imposed
when found to be warranted after a hearing." 06
Violations of the disclosure provisions, as with other discovery
violations, are no longer subject to Rule 11 sanctions. The amended
rules limit Rule 11 sanctions to violations involving pleadings.
C. Rule 26(D Pre-Discovery Meeting
The new rules require that parties meet no later than fourteen
days before the Rule 16(b) conference is scheduled or the 16(b) order
is entered. 67 This meeting offers lawyers an opportunity to informally
refine and clarify the disputed issues between the parties and, if nec-
essary, stipulate to adjustments in the timing of disclosures.68 During
the meeting, the lawyers are to informally discuss the case, settlement
possibilities and disclosures, as well as prepare a discovery/schedul-
ing plan.
Within ten days of the 26(f) meeting, the parties must generate a
detailed discovery/scheduling plan to be submitted to the court before
the Rule 16(b) scheduling order is to be entered (the "plan" or "Pro-
posed Joint Discovery/Scheduling Plan" or the "Proposed Plan"). 69
The plan must contain the proposed timing of disclosures unless the
parties stipulate to "opt-out" of the disclosure requirements. 7° Addition-
ally, the plan should contain the proposed timing of formal discovery,
joinder of parties and issues, dates for lists of trial witnesses, as well as
any other orders sought to be entered under Rule 16(b). The Proposed
Plan also should include times for the parties to supplement disclo-
sures and discovery, as well as times for pretrial motions and settlement
discussions.
66 FED. R. Cm P. 37(c) advisory committee's note.
67 Because the Rule 26(f) meeting is linked io the Rule 16(b) conference, which must take
place 90 days after an appearance, the 26(1) meeting is likely to take place approximately 75 days
after the first appearance.
Some jurisdictions have, by local rule, shortened the time within which the Rule 26(1)
meeting must be held. For example, the local rules in the Western District of Missouri encourage
the parties to hold the 26(f) meeting "as soon as practicable" but no later than 30 days before
the 16(b) scheduling conference. Moreover, some jurisdictions allow the 26(f) meeting to be held
by telephone if the lawyers are located more than a certain distance apart. In Kansas federal
court, for example, that distance is 100 miles, while in the Western District of Missouri it is 75
miles. In Missouri, the 26(1) telephone meeting must be recorded by a court reporter.
68 FED. R. Civ. P. 26(a) & (1) advisory committee's notes.
69 Ftm. R. Civ. P. 26(1); see also FED. R, Ctv. P. Form 35. Form 35 names the proposed plan
as 'The Report of Parties' Planning Meeting."
70 See Fran. R. Cm P. 26(a) & (f).
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Only one Proposed Joint Discovery/Scheduling Plan is to be sub-
mitted to the court. 7 ' Therefore, the plan must include not only the
agreed-to items but also any competing proposals on items not agreed-
to by the parties. For example, if the parties cannot agree on a schedule
for disclosures, the Proposed Plan must include each party's suggested
schedule. The Proposed Joint Discovery/Scheduling Plan is to be a
blueprint for the Rule 16(b) scheduling order and, as such, must be
submitted to the court before the Rule 16(b) conference. 72
D. Limits to Formal Discovery Under the New Rules
The new rules prohibit, with some exceptions, the initiation of any
formal discovery (interrogatories, depositions, document requests or
admissions) before the parties have held the Rule 26(f) meeting." The
new rules also limit the number of interrogatories and depositions
allowed without leave of court. Rule 30 limits to ten the number of
depositions a party may take without leave of court. 74
 Also, a party must
obtain leave of the court to depose a person who has been previously
deposed in the same case or to depose a person anytime prior to the
26(1) meeting." Rule 33 limits to twenty-five the number of interroga-
tories, including subparts, that a party may serve on any other party."
E. Rule 16(b) Scheduling Conference and Order
Under the new rules, the initial scheduling conference could
become very important, a watershed in the litigation. Although Rule
16 does not mandate that a scheduling conference take place, the rule
allows the judge an opportunity to meet the parties' lawyers early in
the litigation, soon after the lawyers have met pursuant to Rule 26(f)."
The Rule 16(b) conference must result in a scheduling order. AI-
71
 See FED. R. CR,. Y. 26(1).
14.
74
	 R. Civ. P. 26(d). Most jurisdictions place the same limit on formal discovery. For
example, in the District of Kansas and the Western District of Missouri, local rules also provide
that formal discovery under Rules 30, 31, 33, 34 and 36 cannot be started before the 26(1)
meeting.
74 FED. R. Cm P. 30(a).
75 Id.
76 FED. R. Ctv. P. 33(a). Rule 26(b) (2) allows local rules and courts to change the presumptive
limits now set on interrogatories and depositions. Many jurisdictions have changed the limits to
formal discovery. For example, in Kansas federal court, local rules allow 30 interrogatories
(including subparts).
77
 Instead of mandating a conference, Rule 16(b) specifies that a scheduling and planning
order "shall issue as soon as practicable but in any event within 90 days after the appearance of
a defendant and within 120 days after the complaint has been served on a defendant." FED. R.
Cm P. 16(h).
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though the rule provides that the scheduling order may be entered
without a hearing, the Advisory Committee anticipated that in most
cases, courts at least will confer with the parties' attorneys by phone. 79
Thus, the rule invites judges to use the Rule 16(b) conference to set
the tone of and exercise control over the course of the litigation.79 This
early conference provides the opportunity for judicial guidance in the
initial formulation of the issues of a case.
Under Rule 16(b), the court must enter a scheduling order after
receiving the parties' Rule 26(f) Proposed Joint Discovery/Scheduling
Plan or after consulting with the lawyers or unrepresented parties." In
no event should this order be entered any later than ninety days after
a defendant has appeared or 120 days after the complaint has been
served.8 '
The scheduling order should include: 82 the parties' agreed sched-
ule of disclosures and discovery;" limits on discovery;" joinder of
parties or amendments to pleadings; schedule for pre-trial motions;
schedule of experts' reports; dates for settlement discussions and, if
appropriate, for mediation;" dates for lists of trial witnesses; and dates
for subsequent pre-trial conferences.
If necessary, the scheduling order can provide special procedures
for handling complex litigation."
III. AUTOMATIC DISCLOSURES: THE SKY Is Nor• FALLING
A. Plaintiffs' and Defendants' Bar: Objections and Predictions
Even before the new rules went into effect on December 1, 1993,
plaintiff and defense lawyers unanimously predicted that automatic
disclosures would have a significant negative impact on their practices.
18 See Flu). R. Civ. P. 16(b) advisory committee's note.
79 The 16(h) conference can be presided over by a judge or magistrate. Fitt). R. Ctv. P. 16(b).
w Id.
81 Id.
82 See FED. R. Civ. P. Form 35.
"Although the court has the discretion to change the timing agreed to by the parties, judges
will likely institute changes only when the agreed-to schedule is unnecessarily long. Most of the
judges I surveyed noted that in the majority of cases the scheduling order (lid not alter the
proposed joint discovery/scheduling plan to which the lawyers had agreed.
84 These include limits on the number of interrogatories, depositions and requests for
admission, as well as limits on the time for expert depositions.
88 Some judges and magistrates are including in the Rule 16(b) scheduling order a dine
limitation or a specific date for the parties to meet to discuss the potential for either settlement
or mediation. Since disclosures and discovery should have been essentially completed, this is a
timely opportunity to consider ways to accelerate the resolution of the dispute, maybe even
without court intervention.
86 S'ee FED. R. Civ. P. 16(b) (6).
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Curiously, plaintiffs' and defendants' attorneys' groups each claimed
that disclosures would unfairly benefit the other. For the most part,
their concerns have proven exaggerated.
Plaintiffs' lawyers predicted that the disclosure provisions would
help defendants because plaintiffs could have to disclose their weak-
nesses before defendants.87 This is not a significant concern. Conceiv-
ably, under the new rules, a plaintiff may have to disclose damaging
information to the defendant prior to the defendant's disclosure of
comparable information. The timing of the parties' disclosures, how-
ever, will have no substantive effect on their obligation to disclose. The
defendant's duty to disclose is not excused simply because plaintiff has
disclosed some damaging information. With some exceptions, a judge
will not allow a defendant to use damaging information against a
plaintiff before the defendant's disclosures shed light on all the facts
of the case." If the plaintiff's disclosure reveals that the lawsuit should
not proceed, however, the defendant should be awarded early dismiss-
al; in such a case, the rule has served its purpose. If, for example, early
disclosures reveal that the lawsuit is time barred or that the plaintiff is
suing the wrong party, the court should stay the defendant's disclosure
obligations pending resolution of a motion to dismiss or for summary
judgment."
To the extent that plaintiffs' lawyers worry that automatic disclo-
sures will rob them of the opportunity discovery affords to find eviden-
tiary support for their claims, their worries are misplaced. It is true
that defendants frequently possess much of the evidence needed to
support a claim. Although this may reduce the specificity of the alle-
gations in the complaint, it does not affect the plaintiffs duty to
disclose. The new rules limit the extent of disclosures to that which
plaintiffs possess or can obtain after reasonable inquiry. 9° If plaintiff's
counsel is unable to determine the exact manner in which the defen-
dant's conduct injured the plaintiff, notice pleading allows general
allegations in the complaint." Vague allegations may result in fewer
disclosures from a defendant, but the new rules do riot affect the level
of plaintiff's disclosure.
87 See, e.g., Bell et al., supra note 19, at 32 & n.120.
" With the possible exception of information that reveals that the lawsuit is groundless or
absolutely barred, some judges are delaying motions to dismiss until all disclosures are made.
Interview with Judge Magistrates Karen Humphreys and Ronald Newman, Nov. 10,1994.
At the very least, the judge should narrow the scope of disclosures to those related to the
potentially dispositive issue.
9" See supra notes 49-53 and accompanying text.




To the extent, however, that plaintiffs' lawyers fear that the new
rules threaten the old practice of file-now-find-support-later, their wor-
ries are valid. With all its shortcomings, the strict formalism of com-
mon-law pleading forced lawyers to prepare thoroughly before filing a
complaint. By contrast, notice pleading and liberal discovery have
permitted lawyers to file lawsuits with little or no support, but with the
hope that discovery might provide subsequent justification. The new
disclosure provisions should reduce the number of federal lawsuits
filed with little or no preparation because failure to disclose supportive
information reasonably available to plaintiff can result in such evi-
dence being excluded at tria1.92 As a result, the new rules compel
plaintiffs' lawyers to gather, before filing suit, all information that
reasonable inquiry might reveal regarding witnesses, documents and
damages.
Mirroring their counterparts, defense attorneys predicted that the
new mandatory disclosure provisions would help plaintiffs and dispro-
portionately hurt defendants. They argued that disclosure provisions
provide plaintiffs' lawyers with unlimited time to prepare minimal
disclosures while defense lawyers must conduct their investigation with
a very short time before disclosure. Defense attorneys asserted that, as
a consequence, they run the risk of producing incomplete disclosures
for which they later may be sanctioned." Defense attorneys also com-
plained that because defendants usually possess the bulk of the rele-
vant documents, the disclosure provisions force defense lawyers "to
start gathering documents as soon as the case is served.'"J 4
This objection also mirrors plaintiffs' attorneys' complaint that
the new rules require them to be prepared earlier in the process. On
both sides complaining lawyers have missed the point. Earlier prepa-
ration of cases is precisely one the goals of the new disclosure provi-
sions. If the new disclosure provisions compel lawyers to prepare their
cases earlier, then the rule will accomplish the purpose of less costly
and time-consuming litigation.
Much of the criticism by defendants and their attorneys boils
down to objections that mandatory disclosures would change the way
in which lawyers traditionally have practiced law. Although the new
rules could force lawyers to practice law differently, this new way of
practicing would benefit the profession.
92 See supra notes 64-65 and accompanying text.
93 See, e.g., Lisa B. Brown & Charles W.R. Brown, Watch Chit far Rule 26 Changes, TE.X LAW.,
June 13, 1994, at 30.
94 Brown & Brown, supra note 93, at 32.
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Some lawyers fear the new rules will not permit litigators to treat
discovery as a war game. Among the least persuasive objection to
automatic disclosures was that offered by car manufacturers and their
lawyers. They expressed concern about their disclosure obligations
when confronted with complaints containing general and vague alle-
gations: "[Given] the thousands of components in motor vehicles, .. .
[the disclosure provisions] would leave the defendant wondering whether
countless [materials] ... should be included in the defendant's disclo-
sures."9" This concern is dubious, given the Machiavellian efforts car
manufacturers and their lawyers routinely undertake to hide relevant
information even when confronted by specific discovery requests. 96
Many defense lawyers denounced the new rules' standard for
disclosure—"relevant to the disputed facts alleged with particularity"—
as ambiguous and likely to lead to more rather than less litigation. 97
They argued that the parties would interpret what is "relevant" differ-
ently, which would lead to extensive collateral litigation further crowd-
ing already overextended judicial dockets. 98 These lawyers do not un-
95 Bell et al., supra note 19, at 42.
96 The instances where car manufacturers and their lawyers have been found to conceal
relevant information despite specific discovery requests and court orders are too numerous to
name. See, e.g., Rozier v. Ford Motor Co., 573 F.2d 1332 (5th Cir. 1978); Delvecchio v. General
Motors Corp., 625 N.E.2d 102'2 (Ill. App. 1993); Nov. 16, 1993 [leg Tr. at 171-74, Stump v.
General Motors Corp. (No. 91-C-09), Dist. Ct.. of Rep. Cty., Kan. (on file with author); Feb. 8,
1993 lieg Tr. at 31-32, Cooper v. General Motors Corp. (No. 23459) Markette Cry., Mich. (on
file with author).
The recent case of Mosely v. General Motors Corp., No. CA-90V6276 (Ca. State Ct., Fulton
County Feb. 26, 1993), offered a rare glimpse into the extreme measures car manufacturers and
their lawyers undertake to conceal information not only from discovery in lawsuits but also from
governmental and regulatory inquiries, See, e.g., Terence Moran, GM Burns Itself, Am. LAW., Apr.
1993, at 68. The Mosely trial demonstrated G.M.'s carefully crafted defense scheme, designed
specifically to prevent plaintiffs (and regulators) from obtaining discoverable information. Id,
The 1993 trial involved allegations that young Shannon Moseley had burned to death as a result
of a defect in the fuel tank of Isis G.M. pick-up truck. Before trial, Moseley's lawyers fortuitously
obtained documents on 22 truck crash tests involving fuel tank placement performed by G.M.,
which the manufacturer and its lawyers had failed to produce to any of the more than 100
plaintiffs who had sued G.M. over fuel-fed truck fires. When the jury found out about GM's
elaborate scheme to conceal discoverable information, it slapped G.M. with $101 million in
punitive damages.
With G.M. and other manufacturers having spent so much effort designing plots to subvert
discovery, it is no wonder they oppose the new disclosure provisions. Failure to disclose will no
longer simply be a violation of discovery requests, it will be a violation of Rule 26(a). Failure to
disclose will likely also be a violation of the Rule 16 order and, as such, contempt of court.
J7 Joanna Stark Abramson, Federal Civil Procedure Amendments Opposed By State Bar Commis-
sioners, Micit. L. WKLY., Aug. 2, 1993, at 1; Bell et al., supra note 19, at 42-43; Brown & Brown,
supra note 93, at 31; McMahon, supra note 50, at Si.
98joanna Stark Abramson, Federal Civil Procedure Amendments Opposed By State Bar Commis-
sioners, MICH. L. WKLY., Aug. 2, 1993, at 1; Bell et al., supra note 19, at 42-43; Brown & Brown,
supra note 93, at 31; McMahon, supra note 50, at SI.
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derstand that under the new rules, a party's obligation to disclose is
based on more than simply the "facts pled with particularity" in the
complaint.
If a defendant is concerned that the vague allegations of the
complaint may make it difficult to determine the scope of disclosure,
the rules require the parties to take further steps to determine what
should be disclosed. If the complaint does not provide sufficient "spe-
cificity," the parties must first meet informally to "attempt to frame a
mutually agreeable [disclosure and discovery) plan."'" If further clari-
fication or refinement is needed before disclosures can be completed,
the court will hold a disclosure/discovery scheduling conference to
resolve any lingering questions about what should be turned over and
when.w° Although the new rules are unlikely to hurt any defendant
who, in good faith, intends to disclose information relevant to the case,
the rules probably will harm those defendants who used discovery as
a weapon in litigation' war-games.
Many defense lawyers erroneously complained that the new rules
would result in more work. The old rules mandated production of
relevant but unprivileged information during the discovery period.
The only difference under the new rules is that the same information
must be disclosed or produced a few steps earlier in the litigation.wl
This may require lawyers to work earlier; but it should not require them
to work more. Even for defense lawyers who in the past successfully
overwhelmed opponents with motions until they gave up, the new
rules do not mean more work. They may even save time and money
because the costs of the Herculean efforts spent to delay discovery
probably exceeded the costs of simply producing the information.
" See FED. R. Cw. P. 26(1) & advisory committee's note.
The lawyers who object to using the 260) meeting to narrow the scope of disclosures
probably believe that informal attempts to resolve discovery disputes are inconsistent with the
adversarial process. These lawyers are likely to routinely respond to discovery requests either with
objections or !notions claiming that the requests are "overly broad, ambiguous and unduly
burdensome," and that the information sought is "not relevant or reasonably calculated to lead
to the discovery of admissible evidence."
In my practice, I regularly encountered lawyers who simply did not believe that the adver-
sarial process contains loom for infOrmal resolution. They never considered simply calling me
to clarify a discovery request they found objectionable. Their knee-jerk reaction to any disputed
discovery request was to respond with a boiler-plate objection or file a motion for protective order.
When I would call them to attempt to clarify their discovery requests, they would respond that
their requests were clear and if I had a problem, they'd "see Inc in court."
1(xl FED. R. Qv. P. I6(b).
wiThe only instance when disclosures would result in more work for defense counsel is when
they must continue with the disclosure process despite clear evidence that the plaintiff's case is
groundless or t.itne barred. If that is the case, defense attorneys should seek to have disclosures
stayed pending the resolution of a !motion to dismiss or for summary judgment.
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Some lawyers predicted that because automatic disclosures do not
replace formal discovery, the new rules simply add another layer of
disputes on top of those initiated by formal discovery disputes.Ri2
 This
prediction also ignores the effect of the informal disclosure process.
Because formal discovery cannot begin until after the parties' lawyers
have begun the disclosure process, most disputes regarding what is
discoverable should be resolved during the Rule 26(f) meeting or, if
needed, during the Rule 16(b) conference. Formal discovery should be
limited to exchanging relevant information not informally disclosed.
Some lawyers protested that the disclosure provision would "force
counsel to attempt to think like opposing counsel."103 This is a peculiar
objection given that this is precisely what lawyers are supposed to do.
Effective litigation strategy requires that lawyers think like their adver-
saries in order to better anticipate their arguments and strategies.
Some lawyers and commentators have criticized the new rules'
provision allowing suspension or modification of disclosure obliga-
tions. They argue that allowing local rules to modify or eliminate
disclosure requirements will lead to a loss of uniformity among federal
courts and confusion among lawyers." This concern underestimates
lawyers' abilities. Diligent lawyers routinely inquire about the local
rules in unfamiliar jurisdictions and are not confused by differing local
procedural rules. This objection also ignores the fact that the CJRA
has already reduced uniformity among federal courts by mandating
that district courts design their own experimental discovery rules.'"
Moreover, to the extent that a lack of uniformity exists regarding the
specifics of disclosure, it is of minimal concern when weighed against
the benefits of the rule.
B. The Executive and Judiciary: Objections and Predictions
The Clinton administration reversed the Bush administration's
support for the new provisions, indicating that "a rule mandating
pre-discovery disclosure is not prudent or in the best interest of the
" See, e.g., Bell et al., supra note 19, at 40-41.
10 For example, at a hearing of the Philadelphia Bar Association's Board of Governors, board
member Robert Newell stated that Rule 26(a) "forces you to guess your opponent's argument."
Flank Grezlak, Bar Opposes New Federal Discovery Rules, LEGAL. INTELLmENcEE, Aug. 2, 1993, at
1; see also Pre-Trial Practice in the 90's and Coping with New Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and
the CivilJustice Reform Act, SECTION Or LITIGATION, ABA ANNUAL. MEETING, Aug. 8, 1994.
1°4 Rule 26(a) (1) allows local courts to modify or completely reject the disclosure require-
menu. As a result many courts have opted out of or modified the disclosure provisions of
26(a) (1). See, e.g., John F. Rooney, Discovery Rule Lacks Uniformity, is Source of Confusion, CHI.
DAILY I. BULL., Apr. 23, 1994, at 17. Rooney points out that as of April 1994, only 38 of 94 federal
districts had adopted the disclosure rule.




United States." 1 "6 The Clinton Department of Justice complained that
for lawyers representing large clients like the United States Govern-
ment, disclosures may take too much time because information is often
scattered throughout the country.'" This concern is premature. To the
extent that disclosures will burden a large entity, its attorneys can seek,
from opponents or the courts, an extension of time to disclose.
Even the Supreme Court got into the fray, with Justice Scalia
refusing to endorse the new amendments."' Justice Scalia's main ob-
jection to the new provisions was that automatic disclosure is inconsis-
tent with the adversarial system.m
C. Disclosures Are Consistent with the Adversary System and Lawyers'
Ethical Obligations
By far the most frequently voiced objection to the disclosure pro-
visions is that disclosure undermines the adversary system. 110 According
to this argument, automatic disclosures create an unworkable conflict
between a lawyer's ethical obligation to "represent a client zealously,"" 1
and the new rules' obligation to disclose relevant information even if
damaging to the client. Lawyers complain that the duty to disclose
without discovery requests "impose[s] an ongoing, affirmative obliga-
tion on the attorney to initiate disclosure to an opponent or the court
of information potentially adverse to the client's interests."' 12 This, they
maintain, "is fundamentally unfair to the client, and places the attor-
ney in a particularly problematic position." According to Justice
Scalia's dissent to the new rules:
The proposed new regime does not fit comfortably within the
American system which relies on adversarial litigation to de-
1 °6 Administration Opposes New Disclosure Rule, NAT'i. 14, July 26, 1993, at 5.
107 Id.
10" Justice Scalia submitted a blistering dissent to which Justices Thomas and Souter joined.
See 61 U.S.L.W. 4392, 4393 (Apr. 27, 1993), 146 F.R.D. 507 (1993).
1110 61 U.S.L.W. at 4393.
""These critics are mostly, but not exclitsively, defense lawyers. See, e.g., Abramson, supra
note 97, at I; Bell et al., supra note 19, at 42-43; Brown & Brown, supra note 93, at 31; McMahon,
supra note 50, at Si; see also 61 U.S.L.W. at 4373; Congressman Poised to Propose Striking Disclosure
Clause in Civil Practice Reforms, BNA BRIEFING, Aug. 2, 1993; Bill To Delete Discovery Rule Reported
to House Committee, BNA BRIEFING, Aug. 6, 1993.
111 MODEL Com: or PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIB urn' Canon 7 (1980). Canon 7 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility admonishes that "[a] lawyer should represent a client zealously within
the bounds of the law." Id.
112 justice. Department Opposes Changes in Rules of Civil Procedure, 8 LIAR. WE., Aug. 2, 1993
(statement of Alfred W. Cortese, Jr., a lawyer representing various defense and business associa-
tions opposed to the rule); see also supra note 110 and accompanying text.
113 justice. Department Opposes Changes in Rules of Civil Procedure, supra note 112.
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velop the facts before a neutral decisionmaker. By placing
upon lawyers the obligation to disclose information damag-
ing to their client—on their own initiative, and in a context
where the lines between what must be disclosed and what
need not be disclosed are not clear but require the exercise
of considerable judgment—the new Rule [26(a)] would place
intolerable strain upon lawyers' ethical duty to represent their
clients and not to assist the opposing side." 4
1. The Misunderstood Adversarial Model
The claim that automatic disclosures undermine the adversary
system reflects a widespread and unfortunate misinterpretation of the
adversarial model of civil dispute resolution. The adversary process is
the primary model of dispute resolution in our Anglo-American legal
system." 5
 Although the adversary process evolved over centuries,"" its
origins include the Norman trial by battle. 117
 Trial by battle was a means
of settling disputes through which the litigants (or their hired fighters)
engaged in physical combat until one or the other surrendered or
suffered clefeat. 118
 Judicial officers, usually connected to the church,
administered the litigants' combat, and both sides were required to
swear under oath that their position (or their clients') was just." 9
Presumably in deference to the adversary process' roots in the trial by
battle, many lawyers today still perceive litigation as "war," discovery as
"battle," and their adversaries as "enemies" to be given no quarter. 12"
1 " 61 U.S.L.W. at 4393.
1111 The adversary model of the Anglo-American judicial system contrasts with what is com-
monly called the inquisitorial or interrogative model used in civil law countries. GEOFFREY C.
HAZARD, JR., The Adversary System, in •ri-tics IN THE PRACTICE OF LAW 120-35 (1978).
I I' STEPHAN LANDSMAN, The History of the Adversary System, in THE ADVERSARY SYSTEM: A
DESCRIPTION AND DEFENSE 7-25 (1984).
117 See, e.g., HAZARD, supra note 115, at 120. But see LANDSMAN, supra note 116, at 8. The
tortuous road from trial by battle to adversarial model included stops at wager of law, trial by
ordeal and the star chamber. See LANDSMAN, supra note 116, at 8-18.
118
 LANDSMAN, supra note 116, at 8. In some types of criminal cases, trial by battle continued
to the death. Id.
115 Id.
12t1 The view that the role of the lawyer in the adversary system is to win at any cost has been
widely Followed by practitioners and enthusiastically supported by many commentators. See, e.g.,
GEORGE SHARSWOOD, LEGAL Erlitcs (1854). More recently, professor Murray Schwartz advanced
that "when acting as an advocate for a client . . . a lawyer is neither legally, professionally, nor
morally accountable for the means used or the ends achieved." Murray L. Schwartz, The Profes-
sionalism and Accountability of Lawyers, 66 CAL. L. REv. 669,673 (1978) (Schwartz calls this "The
Principle of Nonaccountability"). The ethical support for this partisan view is the rationalization
that the lawyer's morality is distinct from, and not implicated in, the client's." David Luban, The
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Once litigation is accepted as a surrogate for war, discovery strategy
necessarily becomes a "win-at-any-cost" battle. Romantic though these
notions may be, in civil cases they are inaccurate.m
The adversary model of civil litigation simply implies that the
interests of disputing parties are advanced by opposing lawyers, with
the judge and jury acting as neutral arbitrators. 122 This contrasts with
the "inquisitorial" model in which the judge is called upon both to
make a decision and to protect the interests of opposing parties.'" The
adversary process depends on the parties, rather than the judge, to
ascertain the legal and factual support for the litigants' respective
positions, as well as to present that proof to the court. 124
In the civil adversary process, the role of opposing counsel is
central and well defined: they are advocates. 128 As advocates, their role
is to employ their innate talents and acquired lawyering skills in a two
step process. In the first step, each advocate defines the issues of a
dispute and seeks legal support for the client's position.'" The advo-
cate also searches for factual support for the client's stance, analyzing
and evaluating all relevant information from all sources.' 27
Once all relevant information is made available to the decision-
maker, the adversary process proceeds with the advocates making com-
petitive presentations to the decisionmaker. In this step the advocates
use the facts and law to present the claims in the light most favorable
to their respective clients.' 28 If the parties' advocates are of roughly
Adversary System Excuse, in Tint GOOD LAwvEn 89 (David Luban ed., 1984) (citing Schwartz'
Principle of Nonaccountability).
t21 Because this Article focuses on the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, my analysis is limited
to the adversary process in civil cases. Moreover, the justifications for winning-at-any-cost in a
criminal defense are not present in civil litigation. See infra notes 141-42 and accompanying text;
see also Murray L. Schwartz, The Zeal of the Civil Advocate, in THE Goon LAWYER 160 (David [Alban
ed.. 1984).
122 See, e.g., HAZARD, supra tune 115, at 120; see also Lon Fuller, The Adversary System, in
TALKS ON AMERICAN LAW 30-32 (Harold Berman ed., 1961).
123 See, e.g., HAZARD, supra note 115, at 120; see also Fuller, supra note 122, at 30-32.
124 1n the inquisitorial model, the court, rather than the parties, determines the law and
conducts its own independent inquiry into the facts of each case. HAZARD, supra note 115, at
120; see also Fuller, supra note 122, at 30-32.
125 HAZARD, supra note 115, at 121; LANDSMAN, supra note 115, at 4.
126 HAZARD, supra note 115, at 121.
127 Id. If the advocate finds weaknesses in the client's position, the advocate's role includes
confronting the client early and advising the client of the viability of alternatives. Only after
mutually agreeing to continue with litigation should the advocate proceed to the next step. The
understanding should be that at any time during the litigation the client has alternatives to all-out
war.
125 1d.
506	 BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW	 [Vol. 36:479
equal ability—an essential premise of the adversary model—fair dis-
pute resolution is fulfilled. 12'
The adversary process presupposes that during the fact-finding
stage of civil litigation, the lawyers for each party tender all discover-
able relevant information and use their skills to make certain their
opponents reciprocate.'" The adversary process in civil litigation never
has contemplated that lawyers use their skills to conceal discoverable
information even as they seek complete discovery from their oppo-
nents. But lawyers who misconstrue "adversary" for "enemy" also mis-
interpret "advocacy" for "winning by any means." To these lawyers,
proper adversarial conduct necessarily includes concealing relevant
information and lying to opponents and decisionmakers, while aggres-
sively preventing opponents from reciprocating.
Under this warped view of the civil adversary model, lawyers ra-
tionalize that they are obligated to turn over discoverable information,
if ever, only when their opponent's discovery request describes it with
photographic detail. Often, however, only their own client possesses
the details. When any reasonable interpretation of the scope of the
opponent's request would include the concealed information, failure
to produce it demonstrates a sophistic interpretation of the adversary
process.' 3 '
The adversary process demands that lawyers promote their clients'
position by advancing evidence favorable to their clients and rebutting
unfavorable evidence. The adversary process does not imply that to
accomplish these goals, the lawyers' duties include concealing unfavor-
able evidence. But it is this misinterpretation of our role as advocates
that permits lawyers to declare that "[a]sking your client for that
smoking gun (pursuant to 26(a)] is very troubling . . . [and] could
damage the attorney-client relationship. "132
E29 See infra notes 149-52 and accompanying text.
I" See, e.g., Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495,500-01 (1947).
131 II is possible that these lawyers simply assume that the support for winning at any cost in
criminal cases is equally applicable to civil cases. As support for the civil-litigation-as-war philoso-
phy, lawyers often cite the zealous partisanship dogma advanced in 1821 by Lord Brougham in
his defense of Queen Caroline against a criminal charge of adultery brought by her husband,
King George IV. To bolster his maneuvering to hinder the prosecution, Brougham stated that
protection of the client was the advocate's "first and only duty; and in performing that duty [the
advocate] .. must go on reckless of the consequences." GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR., Concluding
Reflections, in ETHICS IN run: PRACTICE OF LAW 150 (1978). 1 reiterate that while there may be
some logical rationale for construing criminal litigation as battle, there is none in civil cases. See
info notes 141-42 and accompanying text.
152 Seiberg, supra note 50, at 12.
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The rules of civil procedure provide the framework for the adver-
sarial development and presentation of civil claims. The adversarial
model requires the advocates to prepare and present their clients'
positions within the boundaries of the law and the constraints of their
ethical obligations. Lawyers who interpret Rule 26 (a) 's requirement of
automatic disclosure of all discoverable information as a betrayal of
their commitment to the client and the adversary system misinterpret
their role as adversaries as well as their ethical obligations.
Condemnation of the winning-is-everything approach to adversary
practice is not unique. Neither is the fact that all the critics fail to
distinguish between the win-at-any-cost philosophy and the adversary
model. Most critics of the adversarial model attack the win-at-any-cost
approach on moral or ethical grounds.'" They denounce the adversary
system as morally and ethically deficient because, among other failings,
it pretends to excuse lawyers from moral responsibility and it does not
seek or achieve the truth.'" Some recent commentators have attacked
the win-at-any-cost ethic on Feminist grounds)`' The feminist critique
urges a reexamination of the lawyer's role, but assumes that the win-
at-any-cost approach is an unavoidable "male" characteristic of the
adversary process."' Whether the critiques are moral, ethical, or ferni-
I " Sre,	 Luban, supra note 120, at 83-118; Rhode, supra note 9; Thomas L. Shaffer, The
Unique, Novel, and Unsound Adversary Ethic, 41 Vim), L. REV. 697 (1988); William H. Simon, The
Ideology of Advocacy: Procedural Justice and Professional Ethics, 1978 Wts. L. REV. 30,36-37 (1978).
134 Sec, e.g., Marvin Frankel, The Search for Truth: An Umperial View, U. PA. L. REV. 1031
(1975); Rhode, supra note 9, at 596-98; Shaffer, supra note 133, at 699,
135 See, e.g., Naomi R. Calm, A Preliminary Feminist Critique of Legal Ethics, 4 GE O. j. LEGAL
ETHICS 23 (1990); James C. Foster, Antigones in the Bar: Woman. Langem as Reluctant Adversaries,
10 Lar;sr, Slim. F. 287 (1986); Carrie Menkel -Meadow, Portia in a Different Voice: Some Specula-
tions on a Women's Lawyring Process, 1 BERKELEY WOMEN'S U. 39 (1985),
mCalui, supra note 135; Foster, supra note 135; Menkel-Meadow, supra note 135, at 51-55.
I agree with the feminist critique that the role of a lawyer should consider the client's dispute
within a larger context than the immediate dispute, transcending the instant objective of winning
the battle fur the larger goal of the client's good. Because clients' legal problems do not arise in
a vacuum, it makes sense to consider them in the context of the whole client. l am not qualified
to opine on the suggestion that this lawyering approach, described by sonic feminist comtnenta-
tors as ;ill 'ethic of care," is practiced more often by women than men. Calm, supra note 135, at
45; see also Nina W. Tarr, Two Women Attorneys and Country Practice, 2 Cot,um..f. GENDER & L. 1
(1992).
As support for her argument that women's lawyering process is different than men's, profes-
sor Menkel-Meadow gives the results of Carol Gilligan's study of how girls and boys perceive a
"moral" dilemma differently. Menkel-Meadow, supra note 135, at 4547. Menkel-Meadow de-
scribes the dilemma as follows: Heinz's wife is dying of cancer and requires a drug which he can
only obtain from his pharmacist who is selling the drug at a price Heinz cannot. pay. Gilligan
presents the problem to two eleven-year-olds, Jake and Amy. Id. at 46.
Instead of evaluating the conduct of Jake and Amy as children, 1 would like to analyze the
same dilemma after Jake and Amy have become lawyers. Heinz approaches the two lawyers, Jake
and Amy, for advice. Jake advises Heinz that because life is more valuable than property, he should
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nist, however, they are all based on the assumption that the win-at-any-
cost ethos is inseparable from the adversary process. All these critics,
therefore, advocate the same solution: the abrogation of the adversar-
ial model."' Because it is not intrinsic to the adversary process, discred-
iting the winning-is-everything pathology does not demand invalidat-
ing the adversarial model. Abrogation of the adversary model is not
only unnecessary, it is dangerous.
Despite its flaws, the adversarial model is preferable to the inquisi-
torial model. The inquisitorial model places on judges the potentially
conflicting roles of fact finder and decisionmaker. This burden un-
avoidably allows biases and prejudicial influences to unfairly prejudice
results.'" The wisdom of the adversary process is in placing potentially
conflicting tasks on the participants best suited to their discharge.' 4"
My criticism, therefore, is not directed as much at the adversary system
as at the way many lawyers interpret it. Whether winning at any cost is
steal the drug. Id. Amy, by contrast, wants to first explore a credit transaction. Id. 1Vlenkel-Meadow
argues n o t only that Jake's "single-winner" approach is a male approach, but that this is the only
approach under the adversary process. Id. at 49, 51. 1 am not convinced that Jake's winning-at-
any-cost approach is necessarily a male trait. I am convinced, however, that it is a had-lawyering
trait. Advising a client to engage in a cou rse of action that might land him in jail is not what a
good lawyer would do, irrespective of gender. By contrast, Amy's approach is the essence of good
lawyering within the adversary process. By approaching the opponent to prescribe a course of
action that allows her client to obtain the drug without risking incarceration, Amy uses her
advocacy skills to secure the best result for her client. This is the epitome of good adversarial
lawyering.
Whether the "win-at-any-cost" approach is a genetically determined characteristic or simply
a misinterpretation of the adversary system does not alter my argument that it is not a charac-
teristic necessary to the adversarial model.
L37 See, e.g., LANDSMAN, supra note 116, at 37; Andreas Etillete, Does a Lawyer's Character
Molter?, in 'I'm GOOD LAWYER 270-83 (David Luban ed., 1984); Gerald Postenia, Self-Image,
Iniegrily, and Professional Responsibility, in TtiE GOOD LawrEtt 306-10 (David Luban ed., 1984);
Rhode, supra note 9, at 639-43.
I 3" See, e.g., LANDSMAN, supra note 116, at 23.
139 See, e.g., Lon Fuller and John D. Randall, Professional Responsibility: Report of the Joint
Conference, 44 A.B.A. J. 1159, 1160 (Dec. 1958); see also FIAZARII, supra note 115, at 128;
LANDSMAN, supra note 116, at 37.
The dangers of biased judges who, in the inquisitory model, also should impartially represent
the parties' interests is specially acute in light of our increasingly hostile racial relations. Moreover,
even within the adversary model, it istances of racial, ethnic and gender bias in our judiciary arc
too numerous and well-documented to ignore.
decisionmaker in the adversarial process is only motivated by a desire to resolve
disputes evenhandedly' and expeditiously. Because the judge's motivation is primarily to make a
decision, she does not have to take sides. By contrast, the role of the parties' advocates is solely
to achieve the best results for their respective clients. As such, they are motivated to give their all
to present the best case possible on behalf of their clients. The advocates are expected to take
sides. If the advocates are of roughly equal ability, the adversary model provides a better chalice
for fair dispute resolution than the inquisitorial model. I believe this is true even though
equivalent advocacy is rare. See infra notes 149-52 and accompanying text.
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immoral, unethical or peculiar to males, it is not a necessary compo-
nent of the adversarial model and, more importantly, it simply is not
good lawyering.
I emphasize that. my analysis of the adversary model is limited to
civil cases. The win au-any-cost rationale may be acceptable in criminal
cases because of constitutional mandates and the criminal defense
objective of protecting the individual against the overwhelming power
of the state."' By contrast, the goal of the civil advocate is to resolve a
dispute favorably to the client within a framework that is fair to both
litigants. 142 Winning-at-any-cost is inconsistent with that goal.
2. Automatic Disclosures Are Consistent with Ethical Obligations
Many lawyers argue that automatic disclosures violate the ethical
duty they owe the client under Canon 7 of the Model Code of Profes-
sional Responsibility. This argument not only reads the statement out
of context but it also disregards the rest of the Code.
The Model Code of Professional Responsibility and the Model
Rules of Professional Conduct provide the only formal regulation of
lawyers' conduct toward their clients, opponents, and the courts) ."
Canon 7 of the Model Code of Professional Responsibility urges that
"[a] lawyer should represent a client zealously within the bounds of
the law." Although Canon 7 commands that lawyers represent their
clients zealously, it also admonishes that such representation cannot
be unbridled. A lawyer's zealous representation must be legal and
ethical." 5
Concealing, hiding, or withholding relevant and discoverable in-
formation from an opponent or the court is unlawful. Knowingly
refusing to turn over otherwise discoverable information simply be-
cause it is damaging to the client's position is expressly prohibited by
the rules of civil procedure. Moreover, such concealment is nothing
short of fraud which is unlawful in all jurisdictions.""
See U.S. CONST. amend. V & Vl; 1..tiban, supra note 120, at 91-92; Schwartz, supra note
121. at 155-00.
"2 See, e.g., !Alban, supra note 120, at 92.
"3 Cahn, .supra note 135, al 29.
"' I MODEL CODE 411, PROFESSIONAL RESPONS11111,ITY Canon 7 (1980).
it.; id.
m'The elements o1' a cause of action for fiaud (sometimes referred to as "deceit") are
generally .stated as: (a) a misrepresentation of fact; (h) knowledge that the representation is false
(se enter); (c) intention to induce a party to act or refrain from action in reliance of that
misrepresentation; (d) actual reliance; and (e) damages resulting from such reliance. See, e.g.,
W. PAGIC KEETON cc Al.., PROSSER AND Klaus IN ON THE LAW 01 , ToliTS § 105, at 728 (5th ed. 1984).
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In addition to being illegal, knowingly refusing to turn over dam-
aging information which is discoverable is also unethical. No reason-
able interpretation of Canon 7 can read it to imply that zealous repre-
sentation requires committing or assisting a client to commit fraud.
Not only is concealing or assisting to conceal relevant information not
suggested by the Code, it is explicitly prohibited by the rules of pro-
fessional ethics.
Model Rule 3.4 expressly warns that "[a] lawyer shall not . . .
obstruct another party's access to evidence or unlawfully alter, destroy
or conceal a document or other material having potential evidentiary
value. A lawyer shall not counsel or assist another person to do any
such act.""7 Additionally, Model Rule 1.2 specifically commands that:
[a] lawyer shall not counsel a client to engage, or assist a
client, in conduct that the lawyer knows is ... fraudulent, but
a lawyer may discuss the legal consequences of any proposed
course of conduct with a client and may counsel or assist a
client to make a good faith effort to determine the validity,
scope, meaning or application of the law. 148
Lawyers who insist that automatic disclosures are unethical or
contrary to the adversary system misconstrue the lawyer's role in the
adversary process as well as their ethical obligations under the rules of
professional responsibility.
3. Automatic Disclosures Bring Fairness to the Adversary Process
One of the premises of the adversary process is that having the
disputing parties' positions advanced by competing advocates makes
the adversary model more fair, and therefore, superior to the inquisi-
torial model."• A seldom articulated presupposition to this argument
is that fairness results from the decisionmaker being able to decide be-
tween competing and equivalent presentations by advocates of equiva-
lent, ability.' 50 Because only rarely will the parties have advocates of even
roughly equal ability, the ideal of fairness within the adversary system
is seldom reached.'`''
Such misrepresentation involves not only an affirmative concealment, hut also nondisclosure, Id.
at 737-39.
t'17 Motua. RULES OF PROFESSIONAL. CONDUCT Rule 3.4(a) (1988).
ae MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.2(d) (1988).
"9
 LANDSMAN, Supra note 116, at 49-50; Fuller & Randall, supra note 139, at 1160.
150 See LANDSMAN, supra note 116, at 4; Cahn, supra note 135, at 32; Schwartz, supra note
121, at 153-54.
151 Galan ter, supra note 9, at 97-135; Rhode, supra note 9, at 597.
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The adversary model must continually seek to reduce that built-in
imbalance. One such improvement is provided by the new automatic
disclosure requirements. Prior to the new rules, the quality of the
information available to the decisionmaker was often contingent on
the ability of the parties' advocates. Automatic disclosure means that
irrespective of the advocates' ability, the parties and the decisionmaker
have access to all the relevant facts of a dispute, resulting in a more
fair outcome. 152
4. Full Disclosures Are Nothing New to Good Lawyers
Those who object to automatic disclosure have apparently never
included full disclosure as part of their litigation strategy. Good lawyers,
however, have long been representing clients successfully without con-
cealing information. During my private practice, the lawyers I worked
for emphasized that litigation strategy demands full disclosure from all
parties. We did not condone clients whom we discovered (or sus-
pected) were selectively withholding information. In such cases, we
explained that our role as their lawyers did not include lying on their
behalf or finding justification for their misconduct; that our job was to
use all our talents and legal skills to assist them in reaching as advan-
tageous an outcome as the parameters of the law permit.'" We made
sure clients understood that, in addition to zealous advocacy, our duties
as lawyers included counseling them not to engage in conduct that
could have adverse legal or business ramifications. In that role, we
advised them that concealing relevant information was a bad strategy
because the value to our opponent of information concealed and later
found out is exponentially higher than its value when confronted
head-on.
In my six years of practice we never lost a client because we
counselled full disclosure. Clients valued our role as counsellors and
152 The new disclosure provisions also level the playing field for lawyers who do not practice
in large law firms with unlimited resources.
153 Although I never represented G.M., A.I I. Robbins, or a tobacco company, I did represent
some difficult clients. These clients often wanted to use the discovery process as a weapon. The
most common problem arose when a client wanted to withhold or alter discoverable information.
Dealing with difficult clients is a delicate matter. On one hand, if you cater to their wish to
obstruct discovery, you not only fail yuur ethical obligations but you also fail your client.. Engaging
in discovery abuse more often than not conies back to haunt you and your client. On the other
hand, in our competitive profession, it is economically risky to challenge a client who brings
substantial income to your firm.
There is, however, only one solution. As your client's counselor, it is your duty to convince
the client that obstructing discovery is not only unethical but also a bad business decision which
is likely to hurt in the long rim.
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appreciated that we did not simply act as brash gunslingers. Had the
lawyers who represented G.M. in the Mosely case acted as more than
hired guns, they would have better served G.M.' 54 The $101 million
exemplary damage award was meted out not so much to punish G.M.
for knowingly putting a defective product on the market as it was to
chastise the company and its lawyers for concealing all information
they deemed beyond the comprehension of juries and regulators.' 55
Assisting a client to conceal relevant information potentially adverse
to the client is not only inconsistent with the adversary process and
our ethical obligations, it is just plain bad lawyering.
Furthermore, as attorneys, integrity is our most valued asset. Once
you are known to have subverted the process, your opponents will not
trust you. Worse yet, once judges know you have abused the process,
they will presume you will do it again. If you cannot convince the client
to do the right thing, withdrawing from the case is the only alternative.
Even if you convince yourself that the adversary process demands that
you abuse discovery, you will pay a high price for subverting the system.
D. Automatic Disclosures and the Client's. Interests
In legal folklore, plaintiffs' attorneys want a case promptly re-
solved so they can collect their fees. The contrasting myth of the
defense attorneys is that they prefer to delay the case as much as
possible so that they can churn fees and allow their clients more time
to use the plaintiffs money.
In my practice I found little truth in this folklore. Although I
defended doctors, hospitals, manufacturers, corporations and insurers
in medical malpractice, products liability and commercial cases, I dis-
covered that most plaintiffs' attorneys were slower than I in moving
cases forward. I also learned that, as defendants, my clients valued
predictability above mere numbers. Most of my clients wanted cases to
be concluded promptly so that they accurately could assess the value
of their loss and avoid years of uncertainty as the litigation lingered.
The new disclosure provisions, therefore, advance rather than
hinder the client's interests. The principle behind the disclosure pro-
vision is that lawyers should seek to conclude pre-trial discovery as early
I 51 See supra note 96.
155 See supra note 96; see also Moran, supra note 96, at 7. That G.M.'s exorbitant appellate
team, which included among others, former Attorney General Griffin Bell and former Solicitor
General Kenneth Star, was able to overturn the award does not change the fact that hill disclosure
would have saved the company millions in the long run.
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and as openly as reasonably possible without jeopardizing the client's
case. In my experience, this is also what most clients want from the
civil litigation process.'"
E. Automatic Disclosures and the Managerial Judge
The new discovery provisions of the amended FRCP may sig-
nificantly reduce the time and costs associated with discovery in civil
litigation. Whether the new provisions live up to their potential, how-
ever, will depend on the role both lawyers and judges take in their
implementation. Lawyers must reexamine their role within the adver-
sarial process and take advantage of the opportunity to undertake early
fact-finding which the new rules provide.
Also crucial to the success of the new rules, however, is the role
of the judge. Judges must be willing to become more actively involved
in early management of their cases. The disclosure provisions have as
their expressed goal "to accelerate the exchange of basic information
about the case and to eliminate the paper work involved in requesting
such information." 157 Moreover, the Advisory Committee urges judges
and lawyers that Rule 26(a) (1) "should be applied in a manner to
achieve those objectives."' 58 The effectiveness of the new disclosure
provisions, therefore, will depend in part on whether judges are willing
to enforce them.
"Managerial judges" are essential to achieving the goals of the new
rules)" The combination of the new rules with a managerial judge can
have a salutary effect on how lawyers conduct pre-trial proceedings.
For example, lawyers are more likely to follow their mutually agreed-to
disclosure/discovery schedule if they know that their failure to do so
will prompt the judge to mandate a schedule that may not be as
flexible.
See, e.g., Howard Spierer, General Counsel Speak Their Minds About Outside Litigators:
"Gladiator Mentality" Doesn't Always Win Points With the People Who Pay the Hills, 1,131G. NEWS,
Aug. 1994, at 2. the article contains excerpts from group discussions conducted by the ABA
Section of Litigation's Task Force on Client Concerns. A recurring client complaint is that outside
litigators have a "gladiator mentality" and a "desire to win at all costs" which is intamsistent with
the clients' bigger picture.
157 FED. R. Civ. P. 26(a) advisory committee's note.
im
159 See, e.g., Judith Resnik, Managerial Judges, 96 HA RV. L. Rm.,. 376, 377 (1982). Resnik and
other cornmeittators have described a "manitgerial judge" as one who is willing to shape the
litigation and use the court to influence results.
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F. Mandatory Disclosures Should Be Given a Fair Chance
Rules 26(a), 26(1) and 16(b) offer an excellent opportunity to
curb abusive discovery and its resulting cost to parties and the civil
litigation system. Additionally, the disclosure provisions have the poten-
tial to improve the adversary process and make the system of civil dis-
pute resolution efficient and fair. The Rule 26(1) pre-discovery meeting
offers opposing attorneys an informal venue for early resolution of
pre-trial issues without unnecessary collateral litigation. Because the
Rule 26(f) discovery/scheduling plan must be submitted to the court
shortly before the Rule 16(h) scheduling conference, the parties' at-
torneys are compelled to make a good faith attempt to resolve many
pre-trial issues without court intervention. Furthermore, requiring a
comprehensive Rule 16(b) scheduling order encourages judges to
become involved in the case in the initial stages of the litigation.
The disclosure process may even have the salutary effect of caus-
ing lawyers to reexamine their distorted perception of the adversarial
process. An adversary need not subvert the process to win-by-any-
means. Adversaries can cooperate with each other during fact-finding
and use their advocacy skills to present their case persuasively and
obtain a resolution favorable to their client. Moreover, this adversarial
strategy will prove to be personally rewarding because lawyers can avoid
the emotionally damaging rationalizations necessary to cope with un-
ethical conduct in the name of winning-at-any-cost. This revised adver-
sarial philosophy will also give our profession a shot of desperately
needed integrity as clients and the public notice our recognition that
the client and a fair process are meaningful components of civil dis-
pute resolution.
Lawyers, judges and legislators should allow the new disclosure
process to work for several years before consideration is given to scrap-
ping or changing 4. 16° The federal jurisdictions that opted out of the
new rules should adopt some form of automatic disclosures provi-
sion. 16 ' Lawyers must not attempt to subvert the rules simply to dem-
onstrate their disapproval of the automatic disclosure requirement.
judges must forcefully manage the cases in their docket to ensure that
1641 Section 105(c) (1) of the Civil justice Reform Act of 1990 requires that by December 31,
1995, the judicial Conference report to Congress the experience with various disclosure strategies.
See Feu. R. Civ. P. 26(a) (1) advisory committee's notes. Under § 105(c) (2) (Li) of the CjRA,
Congress could amend the disclosure provisions by December 1998. Id.
161 Many of the jurisdictions which opted-out of 26 (a) (1) were already experimenting with
some forms of disclosure under the mandate of the CJRA. Many others, however, opted-out. under
pressure from groups who oppose automatic disclosures.
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disclosures serve to advance litigation without unfairly affecting one
side or the other.
G. Practice Under the New Rules Has Not Been Fatal
The disclosure provisions have been in effect for almost eighteen
months, and although the predictions of tragedy have not subsided,
they have also not materialized. At a minimum, my informal survey of
the experience of judges and lawyers seems to demonstrate that the
new disclosure provisions are, for the most part, achieving their goals
of faster, less costly discovery despite the melodramatic concerns raised
by their detractors.'"
Some lawyers have declared that they try to avoid federal court in
order to avoid the disclosure provisions; others insist that lawyers and
judges in some courts are simply ignoring them.'" The general re-
sponse 1 have received, however, can be summed up by the comment
of Magistrate Judge Wayne Brazil from the Northern District of Cali-
fornia: 164 "We have had quite substantial compliance and no problems.
Our assessment is that . . . [the disclosure provisions] have had a net
positive effect and the sky has not fallen]"'"" Judge Brazil added that
most judges believe the disclosure provisions in conjunction with the
Rule 26(f) pre-discovery meeting and the Rule 16(b) conference have,
as expected, resulted in earlier case resolution and reduced litiga-
162 Between June and November 1994, I conducted an informal telephone survey of lawyers
and judges around the country asking them a series of questions regarding practice under the
new disclosure provisions of the FRCP. The Judges were from the Northern District of California
(where they have had a similar disclosure provision for about two years), the Western District
Missouri and the District of Kansas. The lawyers were from San Francisco and Palo Alto, Califor-
nia; Kansas City, Topeka and Wichita, Kansas; and Kansas City, Missouri.
From judges I sought information regarding the number of cases handled where disclosures
were used as well as an evaluation of the provisions' intended goals. From lawyers I sought
information on the . number of cases where disclosures were used as well as the type of case, the
amount in controversy, which side the lawyers represented and an evaluation of the provisions'
intended goals.
163 See, e.g., Rooney, supra note 104, at 17. Other lawyers interviewed by the Chicago Daily
Law Bulletin, however, stated that the disclosure provision has worked well and that judges in
Chicago are using it with lawyers who want to use it. Id.
1n ' 4 judge Brazil is probably the first to suggest automatic disclosures as a way of reducing
discovery costs and abuse. See Wayne I). Brazil, The Adversary Character of Civil Discovery: A
Critique and Proposals for Change, 31 VANU. L. REv. 1295, 1348-49 (1078). Ile is presently a
member of the federal procedure commission studying the rules.
163 Telephone conversation with judge Magistrate Wayne D. Brazil, on or about July 11, 1994.
My notes reflect conversations with Judge Brazil on July 8, 11 and 14, 1999. Additionally, a recent
survey of lawyers conducted in the Southern District of Illinois revealed that 00% of the lawyers
believed the rule was working well while 25% said it was not working. See Rooney, supra note 104,
at 17.
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tion.'"" He noted that the new rules have also had the unexpected
effect of more cooperation between lawyers.'" Other judges have can-
firmed that lawyers are using the new provisions to accelerate discovery
noticeably and with few disputes.'"
IV. ONE STATE'S ATTEMPT: A LOOK AT KANSAS
Although to date no state has adopted automatic disclosure pro-
visions similar to those under the FRCP, Alaska is considering adopting
them in 1995. Kansas is typical of the states which have considered but
rejected adoption of automatic disclosures.
A. The Proposed Kansas Amendments
The Civil Code Advisory Committee of the Kansas judicial Council
recently considered amending the state's procedure rules in light of
the new FRCP. The proposed rules make some positive moves toward
more efficient discovery practice. These include a mandatory case
management conference between the parties and the judge early in
the litigation and automatic disclosure of experts. Unfortunately, the
Advisory Committee recommended not adopting either Federal Rule
26(a) (1 )'s automatic disclosures or 26(f)'s mandatory pre-discovery
meeting. The early case management conference could help expedite
the litigation. Failure to incorporate automatic disclosures and a man-
datory informal meeting between opposing counsel prior to the case
management conference, however, would likely reduce the efficiency
of the conference and decrease its potential for expediting litigation.
B. Automatic Disclosures and a Pre-Discovery Meeting Would Make the
Case Management Conference More Efficient
Instead of automatic disclosures and a mandatory pre-discovery
meeting, the proposed Kansas rules require courts to hold a "case
management conference" with the parties' lawyers and with unrepre-
166 Telephone conversation with Judge Magistrate Wayne D. Brazil, on or about July 11 , 1999.
167 a
"Telephone conversations with Chief Judge Patrick Kelly of the District of Kansas on Aug.
29, 1994; Magistrate Judge Ronald Newman of the District of Kansas on Aug. 29, 1994; Magistrate
Judge Sarah Hays of the Western District of Missouri on July 15 and Nov. 18, 1994; Judge James
Ware of the Central District of California on Sept. 28, 1994; Judge Marilyn Hall-Patel of the
Northern District of California on Sept. 29, 1994; Judge Ann C. Williams of the Northern District
of Illinois and Magistrate Judges Franklin Noel and Jonathan Lebedoff of the District of Minne-
sota in November of 1994 and March of 1995.
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sented parties. [ ''`' The court, however, has discretion as to when to hold
the conference. 17" Involving the judge in managing the case early in
the litigation will expedite it. In addition, the proposed rule requires
the court to hold at least one more pre-trial conference. 171
As proposed, however, the case management conference is ine-
fficient. Opposing attorneys will not meet informally before the case
management conference unless they are required to.do so. As a result,
the judge will have to deal with many trivial issues the lawyers could
have resolved on their own. •
Pre-discovery automatic disclosure is one such issue. There is no
automatic disclosure requirement in the proposed rules. However,
subsection (b) (3) of Proposed Rule 60-216 mandates that "the court
shall take appropriate action with respect to . . . [e]xchanging infor-
mation on the issues of the case, including key documents and witness
identification" during the case management conference. 172 This may
indicate that the parties should mutually disclose "core" information
during or shortly after the case management conference. But the
Advisory Committee also seems to have intended that the court set a
schedule for automatic disclosures during the case management con-
ference.'"
If this is what the Advisory Committee intended, the case manage-
ment conference could end up being unreasonably—and unnecessar-
ily—long. The case management conference must deal with issues
related to disclosure, discovery, alternative dispute resolution and pre-
trial motions.'" Additionally, according to the proposed rule, during
the case management conference the judge should deal with topics
IP Proposed Rule 60-216(h) provides that
kin any contested action, other than an action described in subsection (e), the
court shall conduct a case n LiInagtInein conference with counsel and any unrepre-
sented parties. The conference shall be scheduled by the court as soon as possible
and shall be conducted within 45 days of the filing of an answer, However, in the
discretion of the court, the time for the conference may be extended or reduced
to meet the needs of the individual case.
1711 Id. (the proposed rule urges that the case management o ciitlerence should take place
within 45 days of the filing of an answer).
171 Proposed Rule 60-216(a).
172 Proposed Rule 60-216(b) (3).
17 ' 1 Poposed Rules 60-216(1) (4) & (5) require that during the case management conference
the judge establish it plait and schedule for discovery.
Nevertheless, Proposed Ride 60-216(1i) provides that before	 case management ctmfer-
ence (he parties may commence formal discovery. To depose non-parties, they must obtain
agreement from the parties or seek leave of court. This may result in the parties exchanging
discovery requests before they have an opportunity to exchange disclosures.
174 Proposed Rule 60-216(b).
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such as issue narrowing, stipulations and settlement. 176 Because the
case management conference will most likely take place before the
lawyers have had an opportunity to discuss these issues informally, the
conference is likely to be long and inefficient.
The Advisory Committee should require a pre-discovery automat-
ic disclosure process including a mandatory informal meeting between
the parties' lawyers. At the very least, the Advisory Committee should
require the parties' lawyers to meet informally prior to the case man-
agement conference to discuss the case, settlement possibilities, and
disclosures, and to prepare a discovery/scheduling plan to be sent to
the judge no later than five days before the conference." 6 Such a
meeting likely would resolve many issues and result in a more efficient
case management conference.
V. DISCOVERY STRATEGY UNDER THE NEW RULES
Rules 16, 26 and 37 of new FRCP provide an opportunity to
engage in productive fact-finding during the initial stages of litigation.
Expedited discovery will, in turn, result in earlier, less costly resolution
of civil disputes. To expedite fact-finding under the new rules, however,
lawyers must prepare a discovery plan early in the litigation.
The automatic disclosure provisions of Rule 26(a) (1) are closely
linked to two events prescribed by the new rules: the Rule 26(f) pre-
discovery meeting between the parties' lawyers and the Rule 16 Sched-
uling Order. Effective discovery under the new rules must be planned
around these two events.
A. Rule 16 Scheduling Order -
The Rule 16(b) Scheduling Order is a significant event for two
reasons. First, the scheduling order reflects the extent to which the
judge is managing the litigation. Second, the timing of the scheduling
order determines the timing for disclosures and discovery. As pre-
viously discussed, because the Rule 16(b) order must be entered no
later than ninety days after a defendant appears or 120 days after
service, the timing of disclosures can be calculated by backtracking
from the date the court sets the Rule 16(b) conference.'"
"
176 FED. R. Civ. P. 26(f) requires that the Proposed Plan be sent to the judge no later than 4
days before the Rule 16(b) conference.
177 Automatic disclosures must be made within 10 days of the 26(1) pre-discovery meeting,
which must be held no later than 14 days before the Rule 16(b) order is entered. See supra notes
45-46 and accompanying text.
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B. Rule 26(f) Pre-Discovery Meeting
The Rule 26(f) pre-discovery meeting between the parties' lawyers
must be held no later than fourteen days prior to the date the Rule
16(b) Scheduling Order is to be entered. Many courts are setting
scheduling conferences for the date of the Rule 16(b) scheduling
order. If the lawyers cannot agree to a disclosure and discovery plan
during the 26(f) meeting, the court will resolve any disputes during
the Rule 16(b) conference. If the opposing lawyers agree on a disclo-
sure and discovery plan, the court will likely enter the agreed plan as
the court's Rule 16(b) scheduling order. Coupling the 26(0 meeting
of the parties' lawyers with the 16(13)• order should compel lawyers to
resolve many trivial and some substantive disclosure/discovery issues
early in the litigation and without court intervention. Consequently,
the Rule 16(b) scheduling order and the Rule 26(f) meeting are likely
to be watersheds in the litigation. Any discovery strategy, therefore,
must revolve around them.
C. Applying the New Rules: A Hypothetical Scenario for Full, Fair, and
Timely Disclosure
Imagine you are a lawyer representing the Widget Motor Com-
pany ("WMC"), the defendant in a products liability action filed in
federal district court. On April 23, 1994, your client received a com-
plaint and request for waiver of service under amended Rule 4(d).
Plaintiff's attorney mailed these documents by first-class mail on April
22, 1994. The complaint alleges that on May 22, 1993, plaintiff was
involved in an accident where her 1986 WMC pick-up "collided with a
tree on a rural road." The complaint further alleges that plaintiff
"received injuries to her head and back as a result of a defect in the
pick-up truck manufactured by defendant WMC."
WMC's answer is due on June 17, 1994, the sixtieth day after
plaintiff sent the complaint and request for waiver of service. If you
filed your appearance and answer on the last possible day, June 17,
1994, the judge assigned to the case would set a Rule 16(b) scheduling
conference in ninety days,'" for September 9, 1994.
As previously discussed, the first crucial event under the new rule
is the 26(1) pre-discovery meeting. In this case, the informal meeting
is to take place no later than August 26, 1994. Early planning and an
I 78 Many judges are setting the conference sooner. In Kansas federal district court, for
example, judges set the Rule 16 scheduling conference 45 days after the answer is filed.
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aggressive approach should permit you to hold the 26(f) meeting
earlier than August 26 and the 16(h) scheduling conference before
September 9, 1994. The following is an outline of a plan designed to
have the Rule 16(b) conference scheduled for August 19 instead of
September 9, 1994.
1. The Discovery Plan: Pre-Answer Contacts
Early informal discussions between the parties' attorneys regard-
ing the lawsuit in general and disclosures in particular are not only
desirable but strongly recommended by the rules. 179 One way to accom-
plish this is to contact opposing counsel within days of receiving the
complaint and waiver of service request.'" At this time you are unlikely
to have had any time to conduct an investigation. If this is the case,
and the allegations of the complaint are not very specific, you should
suggest an early, informal meeting. The goal is to obtain sufficient
information about the claim so that you and your client have a better
idea of what is "relevant to the facts alleged with particularity," and so
that you can conduct an effective investigation before the time for
initial disclosures.
A more efficient investigation and avoidance of disclosure-related
problems provide the motivation for defense attorneys to seek an early
meeting with opposing counsel. For a defendant, earlier resolution of
the scope of disclosure will result in a more focused, and therefore less
costly and more efficient investigation . 181
 Moreover, armed with specific
information about a claim, defense counsel is less likely to risk court
sanctions for underdisclosure or face ethical dilemmas because of
overdisclosure. If necessary, defense counsel may seek a longer period
of time for disclosures to be made.' 82
175 See, e.g., FED. R. Ctv. I'. 26(a) (1) advisory committee's note.
180
 For plaintiff's lawyers, first contact can be within days of sending the complaint and waiver
of service. This is particularly important if die claims made in the complaint are broadly. stated.
Id.
181 Assuming that a defendant gives a copy of the complaint and waiver of service request to
its lawyer within a week of receiving diem, defense counsel will have little over hair months to
conduct an investigation and complete the Mina! disclosures. If the 26(1) meeting is not held
until the last allowed due, defense counsel may have spent months gathering Mit wmation which
eventually turns out to be unnecessary and will have only a few days to find information he or
she did not expect to have to disclose.
182
 Under the schedule required by the rules, a defendant must make its initial disclosures
no later than 195 days after plaintiff sends its complaint and waiver of service request. In complex
cases or when defendant's materials are not readily accessible, more time may be necessary.
Instead of 10 days after the 26(1) meeting as required by rules, defense attorneys can seek to
extend the time to complete the initial disclosures.
May 19951	 DISCLOSURE RULES 	 521
The prospect of streamlined, less costly litigation provides the
motivation for plaintiffs counsel to agree to meet even before the
defendant files an answer. Instead of spending months faced with
defendant's delays and inefficient discovery disputes, plaintiff's attor-
ney likely will obtain most discoverable materials within the first few
months of litigation. This should considerably reduce the presently
prohibitive cost of taking a complex case to trial.
2. First Contact with Opposing Counsel
Within two or three days of receiving the complaint and waiver of
service, you call plaintiffs attorney and follow up the call (or calls)
with a letter. Assume that in the hypothetical you received the com-
plaint on April 23, telephoned plaintiff's attorney on the 26 and sug-
gested a meeting on Tuesday or Wednesday, May 3 or 4, within ten
clays of receiving the complaint. This allows you to initiate your inves-
tigation more than forty-five days before your answer is due, and more
than 120 clays before the 26(f) meeting must occur. Because the goal
is to keep the first contact casual, you may not want to label the first
meeting with plaintiff's counsel a "26(1) meeting."
My favorite approach is to suggest a breakfast or lunch meeting.
A breakfast or lunch meeting seems less "adversarial" and also provides
a casual opportunity to meet opposing counsel for the first time or to
further cement a previous relationship. I bill the client only about
thirty minutes unless the meeting was remarkably productive and I feel
it saved time.
You may indicate during the first call that it would be a good idea
to meet to talk informally about the suit. Point out that the earlier you
know more details of the claim, the more productive the 26(f) meeting
will be and the earlier plaintiff can obtain defendant's disclosures.
Follow up the initial phone call with a letter. If you have agreed to
meet, the letter should confirm the details. If you could not talk to
plaintiffs counsel or reach an agreement on the meeting, the letter
should repeat your invitation.
This early "pre-26(f) meeting" will force plaintiff's attorney to
conclude her investigation and likewise nudge you and your client to
do the same. It will also start a record that reflects your client's attempts
to complete pre-discovery disclosures early and in good faith.
3. Follow-Up Contact
If plaintiffs attorney does not respond to your initial contact
within seven clays (by May 3), follow up this first contact with another
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call and letter. Again urge that an informal meeting will benefit the
plaintiff because the subsequent 26(f) meeting will be more productive
and result in more meaningful disclosures and a more effective Rule
16(b) scheduling conference. If plaintiff's attorney is unavailable by
phone, send a letter advising counsel that another call will follow
within clays. As further motivation, offer to file your appearance soon
after the initial meeting, thereby shortening all the litigation's dead-
lines. Attempt to schedule the informal breakfast or lunch meeting for
the week of May 9, 1994. This is still a month before your answer is
clue.' 83
4. The Pre-Rule 26(1) Meeting
Let's assume that the earliest you can schedule a lunch meeting
with plaintiff's attorney is May 13, 1994. This is still more than thirty
days before you must file defendant's answer.
Although this is an "informal" meeting, come prepared to make
it productive. You should prepare specific questions related to the
pleadings to help narrow issues. For example, our hypothetical com-
plaint is vague regarding several important facts. The complaint does
not indicate the model of 1986 WMC pick-up involved in the accident
or the precise defect which allegedly caused the plaintiff's injuries.
Additionally, you will want to have the medical records and the names
of all witnesses to the accident, including the paramedics at the scene
and the treating physicians. Having such details early in the litigation
will make your client's investigation more productive and plaintiffs
attorney should have this information readily available. If during the
lunch meeting plaintiff's attorney does not supply the information you
seek, ask that she do so within a few days of the meeting. You should
also ask plaintiff's counsel to describe any information plaintiff needs
the defendant to disclose.
183 If plaintiff's attorney is still elusive, you can show good faith and pressure plaintiff's
attorney by sending sonic of the information WMC must disclose under the rules with the
confirmation letter. If the complaint is as vague as the one in the hypothetical here, these
disclosures may be very limited,
lithe plaintiff's attorney initiates contact early, plaintiff can subtly pressure defense attorneys
by unilaterally disclosing relevant information before any contact with opposing counsel. This
information should he readily accessible since plaintiff's attorney should possess most, if not all,
of plaintiff's materials (like medical records).
You can eliminate any advantages your opponent may have gained from your early disclo-
sures by asking the judge to give short deadlines for your opponent to complete disclosures. Since
you provided opposing counsel with your client's information very early in the litigation, the
judge will probably oblige you.
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Be mindful that you don't appear too formal so plaintiff's attorney
feels you are serving discovery. If you believe that giving plaintiff's
lawyer a written list of items will be too formal for the lunch meeting,
follow-up with a letter confirming your conversations instead.
If this preliminary meeting with your opponent goes well, suggest
that the 26(f) meeting be scheduled for a date soon after you believe
you can complete your initial investigation. If your client has been
involved in previous suits related to the specific product and defect in
question, your investigation could well be completed in less than 60
days. Schedule the Rule 26(f) meeting for July 15, 1994, which is still
more than 30 days earlier than the meeting must be held under the
rules. It is also six weeks before the Rule 16(b) scheduling conference
would have taken place absent your aggressive plan.
5. Follow-Up Letter
In the afternoon of the pre-26(f) lunch meeting, send a letter
thanking plaintiff's attorney for having lunch with you and confirming
what you discussed during the lunch meeting. This letter should in-
clude a list of items you mutually agreed to provide each other as well
as the dates by which you agreed to do so. If you have disclosed some
items, confirm this also. In addition, you should delineate the parame-
ters of the upcoming Rule 26(1) meeting. Use the items you plan to
include in the 26(f) discovery/scheduling plan.' 84
 This adds to the
record of your good faith and will support, if needed, any additional
pressure on the other side at the Rule 16(b) scheduling conference
with the judge. As a further gesture of good faith and cooperation, file
your appearance on May 27, 1994: three weeks before the date re-
quired by Rule 4(b). This will trigger an earlier 26(f) meeting and
16(b) scheduling conference. Under the new rules, the court will
schedule a 16(b) conference no later than 90 days after you filed the
appearance. If the judge schedules the 16(b) conference for August
19, 1994, the 26(f) meeting must be held no later than August 5, 1994.
6. The Rule 26(1) Meeting
The 26(f) meeting will be held on July 15, 1994. You will have had
more than 60 days since the first informal meeting to complete disclo-
sures. If your client is reluctant to provide information, remind your
client that the rules require you to complete disclosures at or within
184 See supra notes 69-72 and accompanying text.
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ten days of the 26(f) meeting. 185
 If you cannot complete disclosures by
then, ask plaintiff's attorney to stipulate to a short extension.
Come prepared to the 26(f) meeting with a draft of the Discov-
ery/Scheduling Plan to be prepared under the rule so that you can
fill it out during the meeting. Use Form 35 of the FRCP as an outline
for this report. Do not expect plaintiff's attorney to agree to a long
extension for you to complete disclosures. Because you have had notice
of the case for several months, the judge will probably be unsympa-
thetic to a claim that you need more than thirty days to complete
disclosures. This is particularly true if you have previously represented
this defendant in similar cases.
7. Service of Formal Discovery
While plaintiff's attorney will probably disclose all relevant infor-
mation without formal discovery, automatic disclosures should not
dissuade you from using the information you obtained informally to
prepare precise formal discovery requests under Rules 30, 31, 33, 34
and 36 for service at the 26(f) meeting on July 15, 1994.
Although the new rules contemplate that everything you could
previously obtain by formal discovery requests should now be volun-
tarily disclosed, it is quite possible that parties will not disclose all the
information "relevant to disputed facts alleged with particularity." Even
if the incomplete disclosure is the result of oversight or honest dis-
agreement over the scope of "relevant information," you should con-
sider serving the other side with formal discovery requests to be sure that
between disclosures and discovery you obtain everything you want.' 86
Advise plaintiff's attorney that to the extent that the responses to the
formal discovery duplicate what has already been disclosed, counsel
need merely so state in the responses to your formal discovery. Under
the Rules, plaintiff's responses to formal discovery will be due on
August 15, 1994.
S. The "Discovery/Scheduling Plan"
Within a few days of the 26(f) meeting, send plaintiff's attorney a
draft of the "Proposed Joint Discovery/Scheduling Plan" you and plain-
tiff's attorney prepared during the meeting. The plan should be enti-
tled "Joint Proposed Discovery and Scheduling Plan."' 87 Urge plaintiff's
185 See supra note 45 and accompanying text.
186 For the same reasons, plaintiff's attorney should also serve formal discovery on defendant
at or shortly after the Rule 26(f) meeting.
187
 Form 35 in the new rules' appendix of forms is meant to provide only a rough outline of
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attorney to amend and return the draft promptly because it must be
submitted to the court within ten days of the 26(f) meeting (no later
than July 26, 1994). To the extent that there are disagreements regard-
ing any items of the plan, you must identify them explicitly in the Joint
Proposed Plan. Include in the proposed plan dates for initial disclo-
sures and responses to discovery as well as the dates when the parties
will supplement their production under Rule 26(e) (1) . 188
9. Rule 16(b) Scheduling Conference
If you and plaintiff's attorney agree on all the items of the Joint
Proposed Discovery/Scheduling Plan, there may be no need to hold
the Rule 16(b) Scheduling Conference. Unless the judge wishes to find
out more about the case, the court will likely adopt the Joint Proposed
Plan as the scheduling order and simply schedule a pre-trial confer-
ence after discovery has been completed.' 89
Since in our case the 26(f) meeting occurred more than a month
earlier than specified under the rules, ask the court to also advance
the Rule 16(b) Scheduling Conference to the week of July 25, 1994.
Assume the Rule 16(b) scheduling conference is set for July 29,
1994. During the conference the judge will assist in resolving disagree-
ments regarding any items of the proposed discovery/scheduling plan.
The scheduling conference will generate a Scheduling Order deline-
ating the parameters of pre-trial.m
10. Rule 16(b) Scheduling Order
If the parties agree to all items discussed during the Rule 26(f)
meeting, the court will simply adopt your Proposed Joint Discov-
ery/Scheduling Plan as the scheduling order. If the court must resolve
disputed issues, the scheduling order will be prepared at or soon after
the Rule 16(a) scheduling conference.
Since the Rule 26(f) meeting occurred over a month ago, you
should seek a scheduling order which mandates that disclosures and
discovery be completed within a very short time. Ask that plaintiff
the proposed discovery/scheduling order devised by the parties' lawyers. Form 115 titles the
proposed discovery/scheduling order "Report of Parties' Planning Meeting." See supra note 69
and accompanying text.
I " For a comprehensive list of the items to be included in the proposed discovery/scheduling
plan, see supra notes 69-72 and accompanying (ext.
189 judges who actively manage their cases almost always hold a Rule 16(b) conference. Even
if opposing lawyers have agreed to a disclosure/discovery schedule, these judges may mod4 it
if they believe the case does not merit such an extended schedule,
1 A See supra notes 77-86 and accompanying text.
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complete supplementation of disclosures and discovery within fifteen
days, by September 2, 1994. Ask the judge to include in the scheduling
order an initial settlement or mediation meeting within thirty days of
the completion of all disclosures and discovery, if you have not mutu-
ally agreed to do so previously.
If disclosures and discovery are substantially completed by the
Rule 16(b) conference, this may also be the perfect time to consult
with the client regarding future strategy in the case. You may need to
confront the client with all the factual information found to date, the
potential for success at trial, cost of proceeding toward trial, as well as
the cost of mediation.l'i
11. Rule 37 Phone Call and Letter
Presumably, opposing counsel will diligently comply with all dis-
closure and discovery requirements, but you should prepare for the
worst. It will take some time for the new rules to eliminate the residue
of the win-at-any-cost philosophy. If plaintiff's attorney has not com-
plied with the Rule 16(b) scheduling order, call and demand compli-
ance within days. Follow up with a letter describing the history of
noncompliance. Threaten to move for sanctions under Rule 37(a) (2)
if compliance is not forthcoming within five days.
VI. CONCLUSION
The recently adopted disclosure provisions of the FRCP can im-
prove discovery, make litigation more efficient and lead to more fair
dispute resolution. Automatic disclosure of "core" information about
a dispute should result in earlier, less costly and more complete fact
finding, leading to more fair dispute resolution. Additionally, automat-
ic disclosures force lawyers to abandon the win-at-any-cost approach to
litigation which has plagued civil dispute resolution. The new rules
compel adversaries to cooperate during discovery. Having to cooperate
in the fact-finding stage of a case will compel lawyers and clients to
reevaluate their view of the adversarial process.
By compelling lawyers to reexamine their roles as adversaries and
to prepare a litigation plan early in the case, the new disclosure provi-
sions will significantly expedite litigation, the original goal of the fed-
eral rules of civil procedure.
191
 This may he the ideal time to consider the potential advantages and disadvantages of
mediation or other forms of alternative dispute resolution.
